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INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 presidential campaign is in full swing, and the future of the 
Supreme Court has become a top concern for candidates and voters.  Five 
of the Court’s nine members will be over the age of seventy by January 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
**  Associate, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.  This Review Essay benefited greatly 
from research assistance by Kyle Hawkins and especially Kyle Brenton.  We would like to express ap-
preciation to Professor Stras’s political science colleagues Jason Roberts and Tim Johnson for assisting 
us in our initial thinking about this project and to the law faculties at the University of Cincinnati, the 
University of California at Davis, the University of Texas, Washington University, and the University of 
Minnesota, and the political science faculty at the University of Minnesota for their comments at work-
shops.  Finally, we are indebted to Rachel Brand, Samuel Bray, Erwin Chemerinsky, Christopher Eis-
gruber, Allan Erbsen, Michael Gerhardt, Arthur Hellman, Toby Heytens, Rob Mikos, Ben Roin, Michael 
Solimine, and Jeff Yates for their suggestions on earlier drafts.  Of course, all remaining errors are our 
own. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1870
2009,1 and there is widespread speculation that the next President will have 
the opportunity to replace one or more of them.2  Candidates on both sides 
of the aisle recognize the stakes.  Republican presidential candidate John 
McCain has promised to select judicial nominees who are “clones” of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.3  Democratic frontrunner Barack Obama 
says “[w]e need [a Supreme Court nominee] who’s got the heart, the empa-
thy, to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom.  The empathy to 
understand what it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or dis-
abled, or old.”4  Voters are paying attention.  In an August 2007 poll, 52% 
of registered voters reported that “the appointment of Supreme Court Jus-
tices” would be “very important” to their vote for President in 2008, and 
88% reported that Supreme Court appointments would be at least “some-
what important.”5 
With impeccable timing comes Christopher Eisgruber’s The Next Jus-
tice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process.6  Written by a 
law professor but aimed at a general audience,7 The Next Justice roughly 
fits the mold of Stephen Carter’s The Confirmation Mess8 and Laurence 
Tribe’s God Save This Honorable Court9 in critically evaluating the selec-
tion process for Supreme Court Justices and offering a program for reform.   
Eisgruber’s book enters a crowded but important field.  The essential 
elements of the appointments process, set out in Article II, Section 2 of the 
 
1  Steven G. Calabresi & John O. McGinnis, McCain and the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 4, 2008, at A14; see Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited July 25, 2008). 
2  See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Justice Clinton?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2007, at A13 (“[I]t is widely 
anticipated that there will be one or more vacancies on the Supreme Court during the next presidential 
term.”); Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/the-
next-supreme-court-justice/ (Dec. 21, 2007, 3:22 p.m.) (agreeing that “[t]he next president is likely to 
make several Supreme Court appointments” and speculating about which Justices may retire). 
3  Jim Galloway, Countdown 2008: Senators Back McCain, Open Rift, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 3, 
2008, at C1 (reporting on an Atlanta campaign rally where McCain promised, “I will try to find clones 
of [Justice Samuel] Alito and [Chief Justice John] Roberts”).  
4  Posting of Carrie Dann to First Read, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/17/
274143.aspx (July 17, 2007, 4:21 p.m.). 
5  Press Release, Qunnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., Voters Back Supreme Court Limit on School Deseg 
3–1, at 5 (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/us08162007.doc.  
Just 11% of registered voters consider the appointment of Supreme Court Justices “not important at all” 
to their votes.  Id. 
6  CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINT-
MENTS PROCESS (2007). 
7  Id. at x (lamenting the lack of understanding of judicial decisionmaking in “American public de-
bate” and explaining that the goal of the book is to help the American public to “understand better how 
the Court operates”).  Eisgruber was previously a law professor at New York University School of Law 
but now serves as the provost of Princeton University. 
8  STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS (1994). 
9  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985). 
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Constitution, are unchanged since the Founding: the President “by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the su-
preme Court.”10  For a variety of structural, external, and judicial reasons, 
however, the politics of federal judicial appointments have fundamentally 
changed in the last eighty years, especially since the 1980s.11  Today, for the 
Supreme Court and United States circuit courts of appeals, the appoint-
ments process is high-stakes, explosively partisan, and often nasty.12  Com-
mentators have called for the abandonment of Senate confirmation 
hearings,13 the direct election of Justices,14 a more assertive and independent 
role for the Senate in pre-approving and rejecting nominees,15 a two-thirds 
supermajority requirement for Senate confirmation,16 and a host of other 
changes.17  Eisgruber, like his predecessors, seeks a more honest and in-
formed method of filling vacancies on the Supreme Court.18  
His argument only partly succeeds.  The Next Justice is a thought-
provoking and original essay about Supreme Court judging trapped in an 
unconvincing book about Court reform.  Eisgruber is at his best as he dis-
sects and counters two popular narratives about the way Supreme Court 
Justices decide cases: one that treats Justices as neutral and nonpolitical 
“umpires,” and another that views Justices as pervasively ideological “poli-
ticians” in robes.19  Those insights make The Next Justice a worthy read in 
spite of the book’s weaknesses, including an unrealistic and likely ineffec-
tive package of reforms.   
Eisgruber’s two-part reform package urges the Senate to confirm only 
“moderate” Justices.  First, at the confirmation hearings, he proposes that 
 
10  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
11  See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1033, 1057–72 (2008). 
12  See id. at 1072–78. 
13  BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS 13–14 (2006). 
14  RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS 
170–78 (2005). 
15  Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of 
Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 992 (1992); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1512 (1992). 
16  Gary J. Simson, Thomas’s Supreme Unfitness—A Letter to the Senate on Advise and Consent, 
78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 649–51 (1993). 
17  See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process is Broken, Can a Statute 
Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 960 (2007) (advocating statutory reform of the confirmation process); 
Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin’, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1328–29 (2007) (proposing a pack-
age of reforms that includes revisions to the ABA’s code of judicial ethics); Richard D. Manoloff, The 
Advice and Consent of the Congress: Toward a Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time, 
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1105 (1993) (proposing that the House of Representatives assume a role in the 
appointments process). 
18  Eisgruber addresses only in passing the substantial developments in the appointments process for 
nominees to the federal circuit courts, where much of the delay, acrimony, and obstruction has taken 
place in recent years.  
19  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 7. 
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senators ask questions designed to uncover extremism.20  Second, if senators 
are not satisfied that a nominee is a moderate, they should reject the nomi-
nation.21  Put another way, Eisgruber wants the Senate to “get smart” and to 
“get tough,” asking more intelligent and probing questions about judicial 
philosophy at the hearings, and then boldly rejecting any nominee who is 
not demonstrably moderate. 
Unfortunately, Eisgruber’s proposals are riddled with problems.  His 
definition of a moderate is supposed to appeal to the political center, but its 
details are noticeably left-leaning.  He also fails to properly diagnose the 
problems with the appointments process and to account for current political 
realities in his reform package.  In particular, his proposals for reforming 
confirmation hearings are unlikely to succeed because they depend on sena-
tors’ willingness to overcome intense political pressure from interest groups 
and the media.  In the past, senators have been unable to do so despite the 
high stakes of Supreme Court appointments. 
But the most serious flaw in Eisgruber’s program for reform, and in 
similar proposals that rely on a “get tough” approach by the Senate, is a 
failure to account for the institutional strength of the President.  As we dem-
onstrate in Part II, drawing on a rich body of political science literature, 
Presidents have an impressive set of tools at their disposal to counter even 
the most aggressive action by the Senate.  The most basic and powerful tool 
is the strategic selection of nominees, especially nominees with excellent 
qualifications, which can make it difficult for senators of the opposition 
party to block a nomination.  Strategic selection is especially important in 
periods of divided government between the political parties.  In addition, 
Presidents can improve the odds of confirmation by “going public” and 
touting the qualifications and attributes of their nominees.  They can also 
counter Senate inaction or obstruction on nominees by making recess ap-
pointments and by employing ordinary legislative techniques like logrolling 
strategies, credible veto threats, and the offer of incentives to encourage re-
calcitrant senators to support a nominee.  Strategic employment of these 
tools makes it difficult for senators, especially those of the President’s 
party, to obstruct Supreme Court nominees. 
This Review Essay proceeds in two parts.  Part I reviews The Next Jus-
tice, evaluating both its novel account of how Supreme Court Justices de-
cide cases and its disappointing call for reform.  Part II focuses on the role 
of the President in judicial appointments and describes the surprisingly 
strong and varied set of tools at the President’s disposal. 
 
20  Id. at 187. 
21  Id. at 183. 
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I. AN IMMODERATE PROPOSAL 
A. The Job Description of a Supreme Court Justice 
The Next Justice advertises itself as a plan for “repairing the Supreme 
Court appointments process,”22 but it would be a mistake to classify The 
Next Justice in the policy reform genre.  “The book’s heart,” Eisgruber ex-
plains, is an argument about how Supreme Court Justices decide cases, 
which has implications for the kind of Justices Americans should prefer.23  
Just as a good manager must understand the job description before hiring an 
employee, Americans “must have a clear understanding of what Supreme 
Court justices do”—specifically, how they decide politically controversial 
cases—to know what kind of individuals should be nominated and con-
firmed.24 
That starting point, Eisgruber recognizes, is “unusual.”25  He notes that 
“[m]any books examine the appointment of Supreme Court justices, and 
many discuss how the Supreme Court should decide cases, but almost none 
connect the two subjects.”26  To correct this “damaging mistake,”27 Eisgru-
ber dedicates almost all of his attention to an analytical model of Supreme 
Court decisionmaking, only briefly articulating and defending a package of 
reforms.28  We turn to those reforms below, but we begin by discussing Eis-
gruber’s job description for a Supreme Court Justice. 
1. Judges as Umpires, Judges as Politicians.—In interviews, Eisgru-
ber has explained that he wrote The Next Justice because he was “disap-
pointed with the quality of the Roberts and Alito hearings” and, in 
particular, with Chief Justice Roberts’s description of Justices as “um-
pires.”29  The book begins with a description of that episode: 
 When John Roberts addressed the Senate at his confirmation hearings, he 
declared that judges, including Supreme Court justices, are like umpires.  
“Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them,” Roberts testified.  “I come 
before the committee with no agenda.  I have no platform.  Judges are not poli-
ticians[.]” . . . 
 Roberts has proven to be an odd sort of umpire.  In contested cases during 
his first term as chief justice, Roberts consistently voted with the Court’s con-
servatives and against its liberals.  In cases settled by a divided vote, Roberts 
 
22  Id. at iii. 
23  Id. at xi. 
24  Id. at 6. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 164–92. 
29  Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/ask-the-
author-christopher-eisgruber-and-the-next-justice-part-i/ (Nov. 14, 2007, 10:11 a.m.). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1874
agreed with the Court’s best-known conservative, Antonin Scalia, 77.5 percent 
of the time, and he voted with John Paul Stevens, commonly regarded as the 
Court’s most liberal member, only 35 percent of the time. . . . [Roberts’s] um-
piring turned out to have a decidedly conservative slant.30 
Eisgruber makes the same point about Clarence Thomas, ridiculing Tho-
mas’s statement to the Senate “that justices ha[ve] to ‘strip down [like] a 
runner,’ casting aside their opinions and values, before deciding a case.”31  
That claim is “unbelievable” and Thomas’s statements to the Senate are 
“patent[ly] inadequa[te],” Eisgruber says, because they are contradicted by 
Thomas’s conservative views on social issues and consistently conservative 
voting record on the Court.32  Eisgruber also criticizes as “disingenuous[]” 
President Reagan’s characterization of Judge Robert Bork, his failed nomi-
nee to the Court, “as an ‘even-handed and open-minded’ judge who was 
neither a conservative nor a liberal.”33  The Senate properly rejected Bork, 
Eisgruber says, because it recognized “that Bork’s judicial philosophy was 
extremely conservative.”34 
Although Eisgruber plainly faults Roberts, Thomas, and Reagan for 
engaging in deception, or perhaps self-delusion, he considers it unremark-
able that Supreme Court Justices’ votes fit an ideological pattern.35  Indeed, 
his central argument is that Justices have no choice but to vote ideologi-
cally.  He illustrates the point using the Equal Protection Clause, which 
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”36  To interpret that clause, “[p]resumably 
[Justices] must ask what it means for the laws to protect people equally.”37  
That question takes the Court “straight to the nerve center of American 
 
30  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 17 (footnotes omitted). 
31  Id. at 182 (second alteration in original); see id. at 145. 
32  Id. at 145, 182.  Eisgruber does not mention that Thomas borrowed the phrase from Learned 
Hand, who praised Justice Benjamin Cardozo as a “runner stripped for the race” in a memorial tribute 
written upon Cardozo’s death in 1939.  See Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 
11 (1939) (“A wise man is one exempt from the handicap of such a past; he is a runner stripped for the 
race . . . .”).  As Mary Ann Glendon has observed, it is striking that Thomas’s statement “was pounced 
upon and ridiculed in the national press and in law school corridors by people who appeared to have no 
idea that Thomas was quoting Hand on Cardozo!”  Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers, Ad-
dress for the American Enterprise Institute Bradley Lecture Series, Nov. 17, 1994, available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17996,filter.all/pub_detail.asp.  Notably, Justice Breyer made the 
same statement during his confirmation hearings several years later.  Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer 
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 119 (1995) (describing the ideal judge as “a runner stripped for the race” and 
explaining to the Senate that a judge should “interpret the law that applies to everyone, not enunciate a 
subjective belief or preference”). 
33  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 153. 
34  Id. at 154. 
35  Id. at 18. 
36  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
37  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 20. 
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ideological controversy,” Eisgruber observes, because “[l]iberals and con-
servatives disagree passionately about what it means for the laws to protect 
groups equally, and about when it is appropriate for the laws to treat one 
group better than another.”38  The public debates over affirmative action and 
same-sex marriage, for example, reflect competing views “about what 
equality means.”39  Applying the Equal Protection Clause in these areas is 
not as simple as calling balls and strikes, Eisgruber argues, because Justices 
“cannot appeal to some uncontroversial standard of equality that exists out-
side and apart from competing theories about equality.”40  The same diffi-
culty arises in construing other provisions written “in spare and short text” 
using “abstract phrases,” including the First and Fourth Amendments.41  
Eisgruber contends that, because these constitutional provisions are inde-
terminate, Justices necessarily must make politically controversial choices 
in interpreting them.42 
In a chapter entitled “The Incoherence of Judicial Restraint,” Eisgruber 
criticizes “strict construction,” “judicial restraint,” and similar “rhetorical 
trick[s]” as close cousins of the umpire analogy that “cannot save judges 
from the need to make politically controversial judgments.”43  He focuses 
most intently, however, on originalism, which he describes as an interpre-
tive strategy that “recommends that when the constitutional text is suscepti-
ble of multiple interpretations, judges and other readers should try to figure 
out what the framers (or the ratifiers) would have intended for us to do.”44  
 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 20–21. 
40  Id.at 21. 
41  Id. at 23–25. 
42  Id. at 21. 
43  Id. at 32–35. 
44  Id. at 35.  Anyone familiar with the scholarly debate about originalism will find Eisgruber’s dis-
cussion deficient.  He describes originalism as a search for “original intent,” ignoring the emergent (and 
now arguably dominant) form of originalism that looks to the “original public meaning” of the constitu-
tional text rather than the subjective intentions of the Framers or ratifiers.  See Randy E. Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–29 (1999) (describing this method as “the 
new originalism”); Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition”, 39 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007) (describing “original public meaning textualism” as “[t]he cutting edge 
of originalist thinking today”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003) (describing “original meaning 
textualism” as “[t]he latest word” in originalism and a new chapter “in the story of originalism working 
itself pure”).  Even Keith Whittington, whom Eisgruber praises for offering “[b]y far the most sophisti-
cated and thorough defense” of originalism, EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 35 n.10, has acknowledged a 
significant shift in originalist methodology toward original public meaning.  See Keith E. Whittington, 
The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609–12 (2004).  Most glaringly, Eisgruber charac-
terizes Akhil Amar and Justice Scalia as intentionalists, when both have expressly rejected that ap-
proach.  Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law Sys-
tem: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION 3, 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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That approach “cannot work,” Eisgruber concludes, because of insurmount-
able methodological problems in determining the original subjective intent 
of the Founders.45  Eisgruber also criticizes originalism’s “ideological 
slant,” noting that “the most vocal proponents of originalism are conserva-
tives” and charging that originalists reach conclusions at odds with their 
own political convictions “between very rarely and never.”46   
Just as he rejects the description of Justices as neutral and nonpolitical 
“umpires,” Eisgruber rejects a competing narrative of Justices as ideo-
logues—“ordinary politicians”—who systematically translate their political 
preferences into judicial decisions.47  Some differences between Justices and 
legislators are institutional, according to Eisgruber.  He sees a sharp con-
trast between the method of decisionmaking on the Court and that of Con-
gress, noting that although both bodies must make political choices, 
“adjudication does not involve lobbying, jawboning, or bargaining in the 
way legislation does.”48  Drawing on his experience as a clerk for Justice 
Stevens, Eisgruber reports that “[t]he work done on the Court is more soli-
tary, more scholarly, and more analytic than what is done in the nearby 
Senate and House office buildings.”49  Another institutional difference be-
tween legislators and Justices is the expectation of impartiality.  Justices, 
unlike members of Congress, may not participate in cases in which they 
have a personal or financial stake.50  Life tenure reinforces the Court’s inde-
pendence by allowing Justices to make decisions without “worry[ing] about 
pleasing voters, patrons, or political parties.”51  
As the strongest proof that Justices are not simply politicians in robes, 
Eisgruber points to cases in which members of the Court unanimously 
agree, even when politicians are divided or would even reach the opposite 
result.  For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional 
Rights, Inc. (FAIR),52 the Court unanimously rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to the Solomon Amendment despite staunch political opposition 
 
45  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 35.  Eisgruber’s inattention to methods other than “original intent” 
originalism is unfortunate because “original public meaning” originalism emerged largely in response to 
the methodological difficulties that Eisgruber identifies.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Pra-
kash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 n.35, 553 (1994); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 725 (1988). 
46  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 40–41. 
47  Id. at 53. 
48  Id. at 52. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 89–90. 
51  Id. at 63.  See generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005) (defending life tenure for Supreme Court Justices 
and proposing a package of retirement incentives to discourage Justices from remaining on the Court too 
long). 
52  547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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to the military’s refusal to hire gay and lesbian attorneys.53  Similarly, in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,54 the Court 
unanimously struck down an ordinance prohibiting the “ritual” killing of 
animals,55 even though almost no one in Congress was willing to join an 
amicus brief supporting that result, fearing that “electoral opponents could 
paint them as sympathetic to animal sacrifice or strange religions.”56  For 
Eisgruber, unanimous decisions in politically controversial cases demon-
strate that judges are not pervasively ideological in their decisionmaking.57 
To explain why Supreme Court Justices do not vote ideologically in 
every case, Eisgruber argues that in addition to their political values, Jus-
tices hold “procedural” values.58  By procedural values, Eisgruber means 
both “small-scale principles,” such as “the right of individuals to receive 
advance notice before the government holds a hearing that affects their in-
terests,” and “larger-scale norms,” such as deference to legislatures, fidelity 
to precedent, and respect for the findings of administrative agencies.59  He 
intends this “conceptual umbrella” to cover a wide range of principles, but 
he views the crucial characteristic of a procedural commitment to be its ca-
pacity to “generate votes that cross ideological lines.”60  Eisgruber argues, 
for example, that the decision in FAIR rested in part on the procedural prin-
ciple that the Court should defer to Congress when setting policy for the 
purpose of raising and supporting armies—a principle that “[t]he liberal jus-
tices could support . . . even if they wished Congress had pursued a differ-
ent policy.”61   
Eisgruber has no illusions that Justices always abide by their proce-
dural values.  Instead, “process and substance intertwine” and “interact with 
one another,” such that a Justice might set aside a procedural value in a par-
ticular case for political reasons.62  Justices who have a procedural commit-
ment to stare decisis, for example, may disregard that commitment to 
overrule a previous decision they dislike.  His point is that procedural val-
ues sometimes point in the opposite direction of political values and that 
 
53  Id. at 70.  For an overview of the political and legal controversy, see Anita J. Fitch, The Solomon 
Amendment: A War on Campus, ARMY LAW., May 2006, at 12–19. 
54  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
55  Id. at 541–42. 
56  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 76. 
57  Id. at 74.  Justice Breyer has reached a similar conclusion based on the Court’s unanimous cases.  
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 110 (2005); see 
also Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2006). 
58  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 79–80. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at 82. 
62  Id. at 96. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1878
“[o]n occasion, procedural convictions may generate alliances that tran-
scend ideological lines.”63 
In Eisgruber’s view, the relationship between political and procedural 
values lies at the heart of judicial philosophy.  Eisgruber defines a “judicial 
philosophy” as “a pattern of selective deference” that “identif[ies] one set of 
issues about which judges should defer to other government officials, and 
another set about which judges should apply and enforce their own, inde-
pendent view of what the Constitution means.”64  As an example, Eisgruber 
describes Justice Brennan’s judicial philosophy, grounded in footnote 4 of 
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,65 as a pattern of selective deference 
in which the courts defer to legislators on issues of “economic regulation” 
but intervene to guard “participatory rights” in the democratic system and 
“protect vulnerable minorities from hostile majorities.”66  If Justices inevi-
tably make political choices, but also inevitably subordinate their political 
choices to procedural commitments in some circumstances, a judicial phi-
losophy describes the types of cases in which a Justice is willing to defer—
whether to Congress, to administrative agencies, or to precedent. 
Building on this understanding of how Supreme Court Justices make 
decisions, Eisgruber argues that we should prefer a particular kind of judi-
cial philosophy, which he describes as “moderate.”67  In Eisgruber’s view, 
there are “two features that characterize a moderate judicial philosophy.”68  
The first is “an open-mindedness toward novel claims of constitutional jus-
tice brought by disadvantaged groups or persons.”69  A moderate Justice, he 
explains, sees judicial review as “a way to make the country more inclusive 
and more responsive to the claims of disadvantaged groups who have suf-
fered through prejudice, misunderstanding, malice, or neglect.”70  Although 
he provides few specifics, Eisgruber notes that this “open-minded, flexible 
approach to constitutional problems” has had “evident” application with re-
spect to “such topics as marital privacy, abortion, and gay rights.”71  Ac-
cording to Eisgruber, a moderate Justice must be willing to intervene to 
protect the disadvantaged even in the absence of a clear warrant in the con-
stitutional text.72  
 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 99. 
65  304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
66  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 101–02. 
67  Id. at 180. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 121.  As a descriptive matter, we find this prong of Eisgruber’s definition closer to “liberal” 
than “moderate.”  See infra notes 97–114 and accompanying text. 
71  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 121. 
72  Id. at 122 (“[M]oderation . . . also emphasizes that courts must sometimes be prepared to craft 
novel, controversial legal remedies in response to claims of constitutional injustice.”). 
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 The second feature of a moderate judicial philosophy, according to 
Eisgruber, is “a lively and thoughtful understanding of the limits of the ju-
dicial role.”73  Thus, a moderate Justice “proceed[s] cautiously when enforc-
ing the Constitution” because “the effective pursuit of constitutional goals 
. . . requires a kind of active partnership between judges and the elected 
branches in which judges will usually play the subsidiary role.”74  In other 
words, moderate Justices are more likely than extremists to subordinate 
their ideological values to their procedural values.75  Moderates, in Eisgru-
ber’s view, also prefer flexible standards over bright-line rules, to give the 
other branches maximum room to maneuver.76 
2. Two Partial Objections.—Eisgruber begins on firm ground in 
thoroughly dismantling the umpire analogy.  Although that account of the 
Court’s work is so oversimplified that it would be dismissed as a straw man 
in academic circles,77 Eisgruber demonstrates that the umpire analogy has 
real currency in the public debate.78  His model of Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking, and in particular his conception of a judicial philosophy as a 
relationship between political and procedural values, is thought-provoking 
and innovative.  Nonetheless, Eisgruber’s account of how Supreme Court 
Justices decide politically controversial cases prompts two partial objec-
tions. 
First, Eisgruber blurs the distinction between political and procedural 
values, making it unclear why some values qualify as procedural while oth-
ers do not.  The term “procedural” is a misnomer, as Eisgruber seems to 
recognize,79 because many of the values he describes have nothing to do 
with rules of procedure, even if in some sense they inform the “process” by 
 
73  Id. at 120. 
74  Id. at 121.  Oddly, Eisgruber does not describe these attributes—deliberate caution and a self-
consciously subsidiary role for the Court—as forms of “judicial restraint.”  Other scholars have de-
scribed judicial restraint as encompassing those characteristics, see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitu-
tional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 27 (2007); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-
Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1983), so it is curious that Eisgruber dismisses judicial restraint as incoher-
ent, EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 31.  
75  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 180–81. 
76  Id. at 121; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreward: The Jus-
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 100–01 (1992). 
77  For more than a century, scholars have roundly criticized similar conceptions of judging as a 
purely technical task, such as Thomas Jefferson’s description of judges as “mere machine[s],” see Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950), and Christopher Langdell’s “mechanical jurisprudence,” see Roscoe 
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).  See also BRIAN BIX, 
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 175–88 (3d ed. 2004) (describing American legal realist cri-
tiques of strong formalism in judicial decisionmaking and recounting the “legal-academic cliché” that 
“we are all realists now”). 
78  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
79  See id. at 80 (alluding to the possibility of other labels and insisting that there is nothing “magic” 
about the term “procedural”). 
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which a Justice thinks about a legal question.  Nor does Eisgruber argue 
that these values should be called “procedural” because they are neutral and 
noncontroversial.  To the contrary, he “insists” that these values are politi-
cally contested in at least two ways.80  One is that the initial choice of pro-
cedural values may be controversial because some procedural values skew 
in favor of particular political results.  For example, Eisgruber acknowl-
edges that “the proposition that ‘accused terrorists must receive all the 
rights afforded to other criminal defendants’ describes a value that is both 
procedural and recognizably liberal.”81  Another, as noted above, is that 
procedural values are often malleable or conflicting, and they may yield to 
political values in particular cases.  The Court in FAIR, Eisgruber explains, 
could have curtailed its deference to Congress in military matters “when 
important values such as academic freedom or the rights of minorities are at 
stake.”82 
Eisgruber’s swift rejection of originalism illustrates the blurred line 
that he draws between political and procedural values.  Given Eisgruber’s 
acknowledgements about the politically contestable and abstract nature of 
procedural values, he readily could have endorsed originalism as a “proce-
dural” principle, valuable in moderating Justices’ political principles and il-
lustrative of how adjudication differs from lawmaking.  Even if he is right 
that originalism often leads to conservative results in practice, it is no more 
malleable than many of his other procedural values.  More importantly, 
originalism has led scholars and judges to results that conflict with their 
ideological commitments or political values.  Originalist arguments have 
persuaded liberal scholars like Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar to conclude 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms that is 
not dependent on service in a militia.83  Originalism also has led conserva-
tive scholars to conclude that some laws they support are unconstitutional 
and some policies they oppose are constitutionally permitted.84  On the Su-
 
80  Id. at 95. 
81  Id. at 9; see also id. at 94–95 (characterizing John Hart Ely’s “representation-reinforcing” theory 
of judicial review as a procedural value, but also the product of “interpretive choices that were politi-
cally and philosophically controversial”). 
82  Id. at 96. 
83  See Laurence H. Tribe, Sanity and the Second Amendment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A16 
(“[S]ome liberal scholars like me, having studied the text and history closely, have concluded, against 
our political instincts, that the Second Amendment protects more than a collective right to own and use 
guns in the service of state militias and national guard units.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 216–23 (1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47–70 (1999). 
84  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 859–63 (2006) (proposing to abolish life tenure for Su-
preme Court Justices but concluding that a statute to accomplish that goal would be unconstitutional); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 75, 75–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (not-
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preme Court, it has prompted some Justices to cast ideologically unex-
pected votes, such as when Justices Scalia and Thomas have sided with 
criminal defendants in Confrontation Clause85 and sentencing cases86 and 
against businesses in punitive damages cases.87  Because the hallmark of a 
procedural value is that “[o]n occasion” it “may generate alliances that tran-
scend ideological lines,”88 originalism would appear to qualify. 
Surprisingly, however, Eisgruber criticizes originalism for its “ideo-
logical slant.”89  He not only notes that most originalists are conservatives, 
but he also suggests that many conservatives subscribe to originalism pre-
cisely because they find the socially conservative views of earlier genera-
tions appealing.90  In addition, Eisgruber argues that disagreements among 
originalists about the proper inferences from historical sources serve as evi-
dence that originalism is a malleable approach that can be bent to serve 
ideological purposes.  Noting the debate between Justice Scalia and Judge 
Michael McConnell about the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 
for example, Eisgruber finds it “difficult to take originalist analysis seri-
ously.”91  “It would be one thing if there were a school of originalist judges 
whose historical research regularly led them to reach constitutional interpre-
tations at odds with their own political convictions,” he writes, but in reality 
most originalists reach results driven by political preferences.92  These are 
the same defects, however, that Eisgruber readily forgives—indeed, “in-
sists” upon—in his procedural values.93   
Eisgruber’s central argument about originalism is that it cannot spare 
Justices from the necessity of making politically controversial judgments.94  
That is a sound objection.  Many originalists concede that the original 
meaning of the constitutional text does not supply a clear answer to every 
                                                                                                                           
ing that under Article I, Section 3, the Vice President has a sound argument for presiding at his own im-
peachment trial and noting the resulting potential for abuse by an “evil, diabolical” Vice President). 
85  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
86  See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
87  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Eisgruber 
acknowledges that Justice Scalia’s adherence to textualism and originalism drove his vote in the punitive 
damages cases, and even concedes that “Scalia’s methodological commitments do matter at the mar-
gins.”  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 115.  Yet he does not classify textualism or originalism as “proce-
dural” values and specifically concludes that originalism is “incoherent.”  Id. at 31–39. 
88  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 96. 
89  Id. at 39–40. 
90  See id. at 40–41. 
91  Id. at 40.  Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Scalia, J.), and City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), with Michael W. McConnell, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 
(1990), and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109 (1990). 
92  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 40. 
93  Id. at 95. 
94  Id. at 35. 
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interpretive question, leaving some core of hard cases involving abstract or 
vague constitutional provisions that require construction using other meth-
ods.95  But for some Justices and scholars, originalism serves to narrow the 
range of permissible choices in the interpretation of constitutional text, and 
at least in some cases originalists have reached results that run contrary to 
their political preferences.96  Eisgruber’s rejection of originalism as incoher-
ent—even as he praises other contestable values that in his view skew in fa-
vor of particular ideological results—creates confusion about what values 
qualify as “procedural” and why.   
Second, Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate is supposed to appeal to 
the political center, but its first prong is noticeably left-leaning.  Special so-
licitude for the claims of the disadvantaged may be an admirable quality in 
a Justice, but surely Eisgruber knows that it is a liberal quality.  Indeed, that 
requirement could have been lifted straight from the judicial philosophy of 
Justice Brennan, whom Eisgruber describes as one of the Court’s “most fa-
mous and effective liberals.”97  As “the quintessential Carolene Products 
justice,” Justice Brennan surely showed the requisite open-mindedness to 
the claims of the disadvantaged through his “functional consideration[] [of] 
the judiciary’s role as a defender of vulnerable minorities and individu-
als.”98  As a matter of partisan politics, moreover, the Democratic Party for 
years has advertised itself as the party of the disadvantaged—the poor, the 
elderly, consumers, organized labor, women, and racial minorities.99  One 
 
95  See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999); Barnett, supra note 44, at 645–46 (“Due to either ambiguity 
or generality, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be ap-
plied to a particular case or controversy. . . .  When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented 
by constitutional construction—within the bounds established by original meaning.”); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006); 
Lawrence B. Solum & Robert W. Bennett, A Dialogue on Originalism Occasioned by 
Bennett’s Electoral College Reform Ain’t Easy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 38 (2006), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/4/. 
96  See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
97  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 184. 
98  Id. at 103.  Eisgruber presumably does not consider Justice Brennan a moderate based on the sec-
ond prong of his definition, which requires caution and partnership with the legislature.  See id. at 183 
(describing Justices Brennan and Scalia as “bold justices who author grand jurisprudential gestures and 
radical changes in the law”). 
99  See 2004 DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION COMM., STRONG AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE 
WORLD: THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR AMERICA 22, 25, 31, 38 (2004), available 
at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf; Mario Cuomo, Keynote Address at the 1984 De-
mocratic National Convention (July 16, 1984), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
PDFFiles/Mario%20Cuomo%20-%201984%20DNC%20Keynote.pdf (asserting that Democrats seek to 
protect “the whole family”); Morris K. Udall, Keynote Address at the 1980 Democratic National Con-
vention (Aug. 11, 1980), available at http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udall/dnc_80.pdf (“[W]e 
have been the party of the disadvantaged in our society.  This is the party that cares about the widow in 
the nursing home, with the kids grown up and gone away.  Sick people, poor people, the small busi-
nessman and the young American trying to find a decent job.”). 
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would have expected a “moderate” judicial philosophy to feature only de-
monstrably centrist political values.  Instead, Eisgruber’s definition of mod-
eration begins on the left, rather than in the middle.  
Consider, for example, that Eisgruber describes exactly five of the 
Court’s current members as moderates: Stevens,100 Ginsburg,101 Breyer,102 
Souter,103 and Kennedy.104  It is true that on some issues, such as regulatory 
policy, the Roberts Court has moved to the right of its predecessors.105  Still, 
it is difficult to argue, as Eisgruber does, that there is not a single identifia-
bly liberal Justice on the Court today.  To use but a few possible measures, 
William Landes and Richard Posner have shown that in cases through the 
2006 Term, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg cast liberal votes in approxi-
mately two-thirds of cases, placing both of them at the cusp of the most lib-
eral quartile of Justices since 1937.106  Similarly, the measure of judicial 
ideology developed in a 2002 article by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn 
(Martin-Quinn scores), which is used widely by political scientists, ranks 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg at the cusp of the most liberal quartile of Jus-
tices since 1953.107  Eisgruber’s assessment is at least out of step with the 
 
100  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 29 (describing Justice Stevens as neither too liberal nor conserva-
tive); id. at 121 (describing Justice Stevens as a “paradigmatic moderate[]”). 
101  Id. at 119, 156. 
102  Id. at 120–21. 
103  Id. at 121. 
104  Id. 
105  See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (describing an 
“ideological sea change on the Supreme Court” that has left “no economic populists on the court, even 
on the liberal wing”); see also Posting of Eric Posner to Convictions: Slate’s Blog on Legal Issues, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/03/17/is-the-supreme-court-biased-in-favor-
of-business.aspx (Mar. 17, 2008, 3:16 p.m.) (“[T]he Supreme Court is not increasingly pro-business, but 
maybe it is increasingly pro-market . . . .”). 
106  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study 47 
(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1126403.  In determining whether votes were liberal or conservative, Landes and Posner used a modi-
fied version of the method originally developed by Harold J. Spaeth for his comprehensive database of 
Supreme Court decisions beginning with the Warren Court.  See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE: 1953–2006 TERMS: DOCUMENTATION 53–55 
(2006), http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/allcourt_codebook.pdf.  The Spaeth database generally codes 
pro-defendant, pro-civil liberties, anti-business, pro-union, and pro-judicial power votes as liberal, and 
votes in the opposite direction as conservative.  Id.  Landes and Posner modified those classifications for 
certain free speech cases (including commercial speech and campaign finance cases), labor cases, and 
federal power cases.  Landes & Posner, supra, at 42.  By Landes and Posner’s measure, Justice Stevens 
cast conservative votes in 34.1% of cases and Justice Ginsburg cast conservative votes in 31.2% of 
cases, placing them at positions thirty-two and thirty-five, respectively, in an ideological ranking of 
forty-three Justices since 1937.  Id. at 47.  Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, by contrast, cast conserva-
tive votes in 64.7% of cases and 68.0% of cases, respectively, placing both in the most conservative 
quartile of Justices.  Id. 
107  Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–46 (2002).  Martin-
Quinn scores are a partly dynamic measure of a Justice’s “ideal point” ideologically, based on patterns 
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“conventional wisdom,” which “routinely describ[es] some justices as lib-
eral and others as conservative.”108  Even Eisgruber mentions “the Court’s 
liberals” when discussing the FAIR case—an odd reference, if the Court in 
fact consists entirely of moderates and extreme conservatives.109 
In particular, a willingness to vindicate constitutional claims concern-
ing “such topics as marital privacy, abortion, and gay rights,”110 regardless 
of their support in the constitutional text, would seem to place a Justice to 
the left of the fault line in constitutional adjudication that is Roe v. Wade.111  
Eisgruber insists that his definition of a “moderate” Justice does not require 
a firm commitment on Roe because it “tells us very little about how he or 
she would weigh the state’s interest in protecting fetal life.”112  The implica-
tion, however, is that his definition does tell us something about how to 
weigh the opposing interests.  Although we do not doubt that Eisgruber is 
sincere in his attempt to craft a definition that avoids locking a nominee into 
a position on abortion, it does not appear that he has succeeded.  The roster 
of Justices he identifies as moderates under his two-part definition—Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Harlan, Kennedy, O’Connor, Powell, Souter, and Stevens113—all 
have supported broad privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
those that have expressly considered Roe and its successors have held un-
animously that the Constitution protects a right to abortion.114   
                                                                                                                           
of agreement between Justices, and have been used for assessing ideological “drift” over time.  See 
Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with 
Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 144–46 
(2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/11/.  The Martin-Quinn scores for 
Justices Stevens (-0.555) and Ginsburg (-0.179) placed them at positions twenty-two and twenty-one, 
respectively, among twenty-nine Justices between 1953 and 1999.  See Martin & Quinn, supra, at 146.  
Justices Kennedy (1.345) and O’Connor (1.325), by contrast, ranked among the Court’s most conserva-
tive Justices at positions five and six, respectively.  See id. 
108  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 18. 
109  Id. at 82. 
110  Id. at 121. 
111  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
112  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 190.   
113  The Next Justice contains several lists of Justices who qualify as moderates under Eisgruber’s 
definition.  See id. at 44, 119, 121, 156.  Several of those lists are referenced in the index as characteriz-
ing these Justices “as moderate.”  Id. at 226, 230, 233–34, 237–38. 
114  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (opinion of the Court joined by Powell, J.); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); id. at 
912–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 
(2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ.).  Justice Harlan left the Court 
shortly before Roe was decided, so we cannot be certain how he would have voted in cases like Roe, Ca-
sey, and Stenberg.  His concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring), did conclude that a state-law prohibition against contraception “violates basic 
values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” and therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
In our correspondence with Eisgruber about an earlier draft of this Review Essay, Eisgruber indi-
cated that Justice White might also be classified as a moderate, noting that he refers to Justice White as a 
“moderate liberal” at one point in the book.  Email from Christopher L. Eisgruber to authors (Mar. 5, 
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Eisgruber offers two justifications for his definition of a moderate.  
The first is circular.  After analyzing the judicial philosophies of Justices 
Breyer and O’Connor, whom he considers to be moderates, Eisgruber con-
cludes that both have been especially protective of the disadvantaged.115  
The second is unpersuasive.  Eisgruber contends that special solicitude for 
the disadvantaged is an extension of impartiality.  Just as a judge must “en-
sure that defendants get fair trials,” a judge has “a similar duty to give fair 
and impartial hearing to claims of justice that depend upon unclear or unset-
tled constitutional principles”—particularly, it seems, where the rights of 
the disadvantaged are at stake.116  On its face, that inference is dubious, and 
Eisgruber scarcely defends it.  A hallmark of judicial impartiality, in Eis-
gruber’s view, is that Justices “ought to be neutral among parties”—for ex-
ample, by declining to participate in cases where they have a personal 
interest.117  Yet Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate appears to be expressly 
non-neutral among parties, placing a thumb on the scale in favor of any 
party that is disadvantaged.118  There are serious arguments that the Judici-
ary has a special obligation to protect the disadvantaged, especially with re-
                                                                                                                           
2008, 12:26 CST) (on file with authors) (citing EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 78).  That reference to Jus-
tice White, however, did not relate to Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate, but rather to the unusual po-
litical alignment of the Court in the flag-burning cases.  See EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 78.  Indeed, 
that same sentence classifies Justice Kennedy as one of the Court’s “most conservative” Justices, not as 
a moderate, even though Eisgruber later explicitly identifies Kennedy as a moderate under his two-part 
definition.  See id. at 78, 119, 121.  In our view, any credible definition of a moderate must include Jus-
tice White, whose Martin-Quinn score places him exactly in the center ideologically among Justices 
since 1953.  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 107, at 146 (placing Justice White at position fifteen 
among twenty-nine Justices with a score of 0.420); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 106, at 46 
(calculating that Justice White cast conservative votes in 60.5% of civil liberties cases but liberal votes 
in 61.6% of economic, union, and tax cases). If Eisgruber agrees with that assessment, the book would 
have benefited from an explicit discussion of how Justice White’s judicial philosophy fits within Eisgru-
ber’s two-part definition of “moderate.” 
115  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 120. 
116  Id. at 182. 
117  Id. at 63. 
118  Eisgruber also defends his definition of a moderate on the ground that he “suspect[s] that many 
Americans will be attracted to the idea that courts should . . . [be] receptive to new claims of injustice 
from powerless or neglected persons or groups.”  Id. at 183.  He offers no support for this “suspect[ed]” 
democratic mandate, however, and we suspect that liberals, not moderates, would be the group of 
Americans most likely to find that value attractive.  Indeed, during the 2008 presidential campaign, De-
mocrat Barack Obama has embraced criteria for selecting Supreme Court Justices that are strikingly 
similar to Eisgruber’s.  Obama intends to nominate judges “who [are] sympathetic enough to those who 
are on the outside, those who are vulnerable, those who are powerless, those who can't have access to 
political power and as a consequence can’t protect themselves . . . from being dealt with sometimes un-
fairly.”  CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer: Interview with Barack Obama (CNN television broadcast 
May 11, 2008), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0805/11/le.01.html.  Contrary to 
Eisgruber’s prediction, these attributes have not drawn bipartisan praise as a moderate approach broadly 
acceptable to most Americans.  Instead, conservatives have criticized the approach outlined by Obama, 
while liberals have praised it.  See David G. Savage, Two Visions of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, 
May 19, 2008, at A8. 
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spect to rights of democratic participation.  John Hart Ely,119 Cass Sun-
stein,120 Robert Cover,121 and many others have articulated principles 
broadly similar to Eisgruber’s.  Yet Eisgruber draws on none of this litera-
ture, instead relying on a questionable inference from impartiality.   
By placing a preference for “moderate” Justices at the core of his rec-
ommendations for the Supreme Court appointments process, Eisgruber has 
assigned himself the challenge of defining a moderate judicial philosophy 
with widespread appeal.  Despite his best efforts, the definition articulated 
in The Next Justice will strike most observers as conspicuously left-leaning.  
That is an important shortcoming of the book, because without agreement 
on what it means to be a moderate, Eisgruber will have difficulty convinc-
ing the public, and senators in particular, to demand the appointment of 
moderates to the Court. 
Notwithstanding these objections, Eisgruber has developed an insight-
ful and thought-provoking account of how Supreme Court Justices make 
decisions.  His model of a judicial philosophy as a relationship between po-
litical and procedural values is particularly innovative.  His arguments lose 
steam, however, in the book’s closing chapters, which discuss how to re-
form the Supreme Court appointments process.  
B. Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process  
Despite the subtitle Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Proc-
ess, Eisgruber’s The Next Justice allocates relatively little attention to how 
the appointments process became broken or how to fix it.  Eisgruber’s 
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking is intriguing, but it dominates the 
book, leaving the policy reform discussion underdeveloped.  We now turn 
to the book’s assessment of the problem and its program for reform. 
1. An Incomplete Diagnosis.—In a terse chapter offering a diagnosis 
of the ills of the judicial appointments process, Eisgruber points to Presi-
dents who have “raised the stakes” by nominating extremists rather than 
moderates.122  As examples, he points to President Nixon’s nominations of 
Warren Burger, Clement Haynsworth, and Harold Carswell, and President 
Reagan’s nominations of Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork.123  It used to be 
different, Eisgruber says.  President Eisenhower made nominations to the 
Supreme Court with almost no consideration of judicial philosophy: he 
tapped Earl Warren as Chief Justice as payback for delivering California in 
 
119  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73–179 (1980). 
120  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 187, 192–93 (1990) (proposing a sub-
stantive canon of interpretation requiring broad interpretation of statutes protecting disadvantaged 
groups). 
121  See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1287 (1982). 
122  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 124–43. 
123  Id. at 125–29. 
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the presidential election, and he named William Brennan because he wanted 
to appoint a Catholic Democrat.124  For Eisgruber, the ideal state of affairs 
would be “a revival of the Eisenhower Administration’s moderate approach 
to judicial appointments.”125 
But Eisgruber has no illusions of a return to a halcyon nonpolitical age.  
“Ironically enough,” he explains, it was Eisenhower’s appointments to the 
Warren Court, which rendered controversial decisions on hot-button issues 
like race and abortion, “that [have] precluded subsequent presidents from 
following Eisenhower’s examples.”126  Today it is “unimaginable” that a 
President would pay so little attention to a nominee’s political ideology.127  
Expecting Presidents voluntarily to depoliticize the appointments process is 
unrealistic, he acknowledges, because “[t]he Supreme Court’s political 
prominence on any number of issues gives liberal and conservative presi-
dents alike the incentive to look for ideologically pure nominees.”128 
Rather than focus directly on the Presidency,129 Eisgruber indirectly 
addresses the problem of ideological selection by suggesting two reform 
measures for the Senate.  First, at the confirmation hearings, “the Senate’s 
aim, and the public’s, should be to understand what a nominee thinks judi-
cial review is good for, and to evaluate whether that judicial philosophy is 
an acceptable one.”130  Consonant with his preference for judicial moder-
ates, Eisgruber recommends questions aimed at uncovering extremism.131  
Second, the Senate must “vigorously” exercise its “constitutional preroga-
tive to insist on the appointment of judicial moderates.”132  The Senate 
“ought not to regard the confirmation hearings either as the principal means 
for exploring a nominee’s judicial philosophy or as a test that, if passed, en-
titles the nominee to confirmation.”133  Instead, senators should consult pub-
 
124  Id. at 128–29.  Similarly, Warren Harding appointed Pierce Butler to the Supreme Court because 
he was looking for a Catholic Democrat to replace the retiring Joseph Day.  See David R. Stras, Pierce 
Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
125  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142.  This abbreviated timeline is a bit misleading, as it leaves out 
the highly political appointments to the Court by President Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal.  If 
any President “raised the stakes” by selecting Justices with an eye toward specific results, it was Roose-
velt, whose self-conscious effort to “wrest control of the judiciary from the conservative forces of his 
day” included an infamous court-packing plan.  WITTES, supra note 13, at 33. 
126  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 187.  
129  To be fair, Eisgruber laments that many scholars have unsuccessfully proposed reforms to the 
judicial appointments process because such reforms have failed to take into account the strength of the 
Presidency.  See id. at 124–25.  Eisgruber’s proposed reforms, however, focus almost exclusively on the 
Senate.  Indeed, he concedes the President’s incentives to make ideologically driven appointments, in-
stead looking to the Senate to prevent the President from placing extremists on the Court.  Id. at 186–91. 
130  Id. at 187. 
131  Id. at 169–77. 
132  Id. at 183. 
133  Id. at 187.  
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licly available materials about a nominee and, “[i]f the nominee’s record 
suggests to senators that his or her views about the purpose of judicial re-
view are rigid or extreme rather than moderate,” they should reject the 
nomination.134 
To simplify, Eisgruber wants the Senate to “get smart” and to “get 
tough.”  Senators must ask smarter questions that are designed to assess 
whether a nominee is a moderate.  Senators must also stand tough against a 
President who nominates an extremist, even if they find the nominee’s po-
litical views attractive.  Before delving into the specifics of Eisgruber’s re-
forms, there are two notable flaws in Eisgruber’s assessment of how the 
appointments process became broken.   
One is that Eisgruber’s proposed reforms for the Senate are not tailored 
to the problems that he identifies in the appointments process.  He is correct 
that Presidents have chosen more ideological nominees in response to the 
Supreme Court’s increasingly prominent role in deciding hot-button politi-
cal, social, and cultural issues.135  That account, however, suggests that the 
Judiciary has raised the stakes by issuing politically controversial opinions, 
and Presidents have acted largely in response to the expansion of judicial 
power.  For that reason, Eisgruber’s solution—a smarter, tougher Senate as 
a check on an out-of-control President—does not match his account of the 
source of the problem, which is rooted in political pressures generated by 
the Court.  Senators face similar pressure, and Eisgruber offers no reason to 
believe that they can “get smart” and “get tough” where Presidents have 
fallen short. 
Another flaw is that, like many other commentators, Eisgruber makes 
little attempt to identify the full range of factors that have contributed to the 
politicization of the appointments process.136  He zeroes in on one: the 
choices of Presidents in response to the controversial role of the Supreme 
Court.  That account, however, is incomplete.   
As one of us has argued elsewhere, structural and external factors, in 
addition to judicial factors, have driven a fundamental transformation of the 
judicial appointments process over the last eighty years.137  Structurally, the 
Seventeenth Amendment and the advent of roll-call votes and public hear-
ings on judicial nominations have made senators directly accountable to 
their constituents for every vote on Supreme Court nominees.138  In addi-
 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 142 (conceding that ideological appointments to the Court began in response to the contro-
versial decisions of the Warren Court); see also Stras, supra note 11, at 1068–69 (noting that the Judici-
ary has contributed to the high stakes and politicization of the confirmation process “as the federal 
courts are increasingly injected into matters of social, religious, and political importance”). 
136  Stras, supra note 11, at 1056–57 (discussing previous literature that has offered a partial, but not 
comprehensive, explanation for changes in the Supreme Court appointments process). 
137  Id. at 1057. 
138  Id. at 1057–62 (describing the unanticipated effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Su-
preme Court appointments process); see also JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME 
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tion, external pressure from interest groups and the media has increased the 
visibility and the political consequences of those votes.139  Senators are un-
der considerable pressure to cast a vote consistent with their own “policy 
brand” because interest groups and constituents pay close attention to votes 
on judicial nominations.140  The combined effect of these changes has been 
intense political pressure on senators to deliver, or to block, Justices with 
particular ideological views.  Moreover, these structural and external factors 
operate directly on the Senate, undermining Eisgruber’s assumption that 
senators will be able to withstand the same political pressures that have 
prompted Presidents to raise the stakes.  As we explain below, by beginning 
from an incomplete diagnosis, Eisgruber has arrived at an ineffective pre-
scription. 
2. Get Smart.—The first plank of Eisgruber’s proposal focuses on the 
Senate confirmation hearings.  His complaint is that nominees to the Court 
“[i]n the post-Bork era” have “played it safe, refusing to say anything 
meaningful about their view of the Constitution and the Court’s role.”141  To 
overcome nominees’ evasiveness, Eisgruber proposes that senators should 
try “to understand what a nominee thinks judicial review is good for” by 
asking questions about procedural values and the circumstances in which 
the nominee believes judicial review is appropriate.142  He also suggests 
some specific questions, like, “Could you tell us something about the values 
and purposes that will guide you when you interpret provisions like the 
equal protection clause?” and “[W]hen and why is it a good thing to have 
judges intervening in the political process of a democratic country?”143 
Answers to these questions would indeed be illuminating.  In fact, a 
host of other scholars have preceded Eisgruber in proposing equally pene-
trating questions for Supreme Court nominees.144  For three reasons, how-
                                                                                                                           
COURT NOMINEES 52–53 (1995) (describing the adoption of a requirement for a roll-call vote on judicial 
nominations); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appoint-
ments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 490–92 (1998) (discussing the effects of public hear-
ings on nominees). 
139  Stras, supra note 11, at 1062–68. 
140  On politicians’ conscious efforts to shape their “policy brand,” see Helmut Schneider, Branding 
in Politics—Manifestations, Relevance and Identity-Oriented Management, 3 J. POL. MARKETING 41, 
49–50 (2004). 
141  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4. 
142  Id. at 187. 
143  Id. at 169–70, 173. 
144  See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 8, at 151 (arguing that the Senate should eschew ideological ques-
tioning in favor of evaluating the moral character of nominees); DAVIS, supra note 14, at 161–63 (criti-
cizing senators’ “softball” questions and their requests for commitments from nominees, and urging the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to “restore their legitimate role and be willing to hold interest groups at 
bay”); TRIBE, supra note 9, at 94 (proposing that senators’ questions be directed at whether nominees 
adhere to “constitutional landmarks [that] are . . . crucial to our sense of what America is all about”); 
Lininger, supra note 17, at 1328–29 (proposing revisions to the ABA’s code of judicial ethics that would 
allow nominees to answer more questions about particular cases); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straighten-
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ever, it is difficult to imagine Eisgruber’s change in emphasis at the confir-
mation hearings succeeding. 
First, senators have been unwilling or unable to ask comparable ques-
tions in the past.  Senate confirmation hearings today are designed princi-
pally to satisfy the demands of external players, especially the media and 
interest groups.145  Many senators therefore use the hearings to make politi-
cal statements, not to ask questions.146  Eisgruber encourages senators to use 
the national spotlight to ask subtle and sophisticated questions in service of 
the “bland virtue” of moderation,147 even though his proposal would not 
please interest groups that care “above all else” about results on particular 
political issues, especially abortion.148  That expectation is unrealistic be-
cause interest groups now play a central role in the Senate hearings149 and 
they care almost entirely about results, not philosophy.150  As one senator 
put it, “If an interest group says ‘this is a key vote, we’re watching this 
vote,’ then the easy thing to do is to vote the way the group wants.”151  
Senators therefore have strong political incentives to use the hearings to 
                                                                                                                           
ing Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562–70 (1995) (book review) (supporting a robus-
tly ideological confirmation process, including “litmus test” questions); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmations, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 38 
(2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/post_and_siegel.html (proposing that senators “ask Su-
preme Court nominees about how they would have voted in cases that the Supreme Court has already 
decided”). 
145  Stras, supra note 11, at 1066. 
146  DAVIS, supra note 14, at 160–61 (“[Many senators] use their time as a pulpit preacher rather 
than as a questioner.”); see also Gerhardt, supra note 138, at 531 (noting that Senate confirmation hear-
ings emerged because the practice “provided senators with the opportunity, especially in high-profile 
cases, to get free publicity for their activities”). 
147  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 183. 
148  Id. at 190. 
149  WITTES, supra note 13, at 32 (noting that interest groups “to a great extent, now drive the proc-
ess”); Stras, supra note 11, at 1062 (“[T]he number and influence of organized interest groups partici-
pating in judicial nominations has skyrocketed over the past sixty years.”); see MALTESE, supra note 
138, at 91; Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme 
Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 519 (1998); Arthur D. Hell-
man, Reining in the Supreme Court: Are Term Limits the Answer?, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 291, 302 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) 
(“[T]he ‘judicial confirmation wars,’ with their extreme rhetoric and unwillingness to compromise, are 
driven in very large part by the agendas of advocacy groups for whom the nominees are trophies—
trophies of power and influence.”). 
150  We know of no interest group, for example, that pressures both parties to appoint moderates to 
the Supreme Court.  Certainly such pressure has not come from the groups most explicitly interested in 
judicial philosophy: the Federalist Society and the American Constitution Society. 
151  Lauren C. Bell, Senate Confirmations in an Interest Group Age, EXTENSIONS, Spring 2004, 
available at http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/spring2004/Bell.html (quoting an anony-
mous senator). 
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score points with interest groups, to bolster their liberal or conservative 
bona fides, and to draw attention to their pet issues.152 
Second, nominees have proven adept at avoiding questions.  Eisgruber 
deplores the fact that nominees since Robert Bork have answered questions 
with platitudes and evasion,153 but he recognizes that no questions posed by 
senators can operate as “magic bullets” to “pierce the defensive armor of 
nominees.”154  Indeed, it is likely that his proposed questions will be easy to 
dodge.  Most “procedural” values, like deference to other decisionmakers, 
sound neutral and noncontroversial, giving a nominee an easy way out: en-
dorsing the principle in the abstract but declining to speculate about how it 
might apply in particular cases.  Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito used this strategy in responding to questions about stare decisis at 
their confirmation hearings.155  It would require heroic persistence by a 
senator to extract answers from a recalcitrant nominee that would yield 
enough information to uncover a complete, moderate judicial philosophy 
conforming to Eisgruber’s model.156 
Instead, Eisgruber’s goal is to craft questions that “permit a coopera-
tive nominee to share his or her judicial philosophy without taking specific 
positions on hot-button cases.”157  The real challenge, then, is to convince 
nominees to “cooperate,” and as Eisgruber concedes, they have done pre-
cisely the opposite since the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork.  Eisgruber’s 
proposal for senators to “get smart” therefore depends on the success of his 
plan for them to “get tough.”  Only by shifting the burden to a nominee to 
“prov[e] that he or she is [a moderate]” and backing up that shift with a 
threat to reject nominees who do not cooperate at the hearings can the Sen-
ate expect Eisgruber’s line of questioning to be effective.158 
 
152  See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 161–62; Stras, supra note 11, at 1066 (“[I]t is not unfair to charac-
terize the seemingly futile questioning of a nominee by senators as a stage on which they can posture to 
and please constituents and interest groups.”).  In some cases, senators have literally read questions from 
a script provided by an interest group.  DAVIS, supra note 14, at 163.  Although interest groups are not 
“all-powerful,” they present a serious obstacle to proposals for reform because they wield enormous in-
fluence and their “truces are likely to be temporary.”  Hellman, supra note 149, at 302. 
153  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4 (agreeing with Senator Arlen Specter’s characterization of mod-
ern confirmation hearings as “a subtle minuet” between senators and nominees). 
154  Id. at 169. 
155  See Robin Toner, In Complex Dance, Roberts Pays Tribute to Years of Precedent Behind Roe v. 
Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A24 (noting Roberts’s comment that Roe is “entitled to respect 
under principles of stare decisis”); Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Alito Leaves Door Open to Re-
versing ‘Roe’, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1 (noting Alito’s comment that Roe is “a precedent that 
is protected, entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare decisis”). 
156  Eisgruber acknowledges this problem but maintains that the Senate can force recalcitrant nomi-
nees to answer by “getting tough” and threatening to reject nominees who are not more forthcoming.  
See infra Part I.B.3. 
157  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 173 (emphasis added). 
158  Id. at 177.  
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Third, even if senators were to ask and nominees were to fully answer 
Eisgruber’s questions, there is reason to doubt that the answers would be 
meaningful.  A recent study of the Rehnquist Court by Jason Czarnezki, 
William Ford, and Lori Ringhand compared the statements of Justices at 
confirmation hearings with their pattern of voting on the Court on four sub-
jects: stare decisis, originalism, the rights of criminal defendants, and the 
use of legislative history.159  They concluded that “the confirmation hearings 
are providing very little substantive information as to future judicial behav-
ior,”160 finding a particularly weak correlation between Justices’ statements 
about stare decisis and the frequency with which they voted to overturn 
precedent.161  That conclusion is particularly discouraging for Eisgruber’s 
reforms because the study involved answers about some of his “procedural 
values.”  Yet the study’s conclusion should come as no surprise.  Nominees 
have every incentive to disclose selectively or obscure aspects of their judi-
cial philosophy to make themselves as appealing as possible to the Senate.  
If senators adopted Eisgruber’s “solicitude for the disadvantaged” as a lit-
mus test, for example, even the most conservative nominees would have a 
strong incentive to characterize their judicial philosophy as consistent with 
that principle, rendering their answers at the confirmation hearings unhelp-
ful. 
Ultimately, Eisgruber’s proposal for the Senate to “get smart” is not a 
“repair” so much as a change in mindset.  What we need, he says, is “a bet-
ter way to talk about Supreme Court appointments,”162 and the thrust of his 
plan is to improve “public understanding[]” of how Supreme Court Justices 
decide cases.163  Eisgruber is plainly echoing Stephen Carter, who likewise 
has argued that we can clean up the confirmation mess only by changing 
“our attitudes toward the Court as an institution” and our understanding of 
“the judicial role.”164  As a charter for reform, however, Eisgruber’s plan is 
unrealistic.  Senators are under tremendous pressure to deliver ideological 
results and will not lightly surrender their political goals for the sake of ab-
stractions.  Much as we would like to believe in the transformative power of 
“attitudes” and “understandings” prescribed by law professors, Eisgruber’s 
suggestions are not viable in light of the political realities of the confirma-
tion process.165 
 
159  Jason J. Czarnezki et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of 
the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 136–37, 150 (2007). 
160  Id. at 158. 
161  Id. at 140–41. 
162  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4. 
163  Id. at 16. 
164  CARTER, supra note 8, at 188–89. 
165  See WITTES, supra note 13, at 35 (commenting, on Carter’s proposals, that “the forces that drive 
political polarization and partisanship—whatever one believes them to be—[are not] likely to yield be-
fore plaintive pleading from one law professor”). 
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3. Get Tough.—The second plank of Eisgruber’s plan calls for the 
Senate to “get tough.”  If a nominee appears to be too extreme or is too re-
calcitrant in answering questions, the Senate can and should reject the 
nomination.166  Eisgruber does not mean merely that senators should insist 
upon moderate nominees for tactical reasons, hoping to minimize the dam-
age when the White House is controlled by the opposing party.167  Instead, 
because he believes there are “[g]enuine reasons for preferring moderate 
Justices,” he expects senators to demand moderation even when they be-
lieve an ideologically like-minded extremist could be nominated and con-
firmed.168 
At first glance, this aspect of Eisgruber’s proposal seems more promis-
ing.  Scholars like Michael Gerhardt and Cass Sunstein have been advanc-
ing similar “get tough” recommendations since the early 1990s, urging the 
Senate to stop giving nominees the “benefit of the doubt,”169 to develop 
“some consensus on the credentials it would like for judicial nominees to 
possess . . . [and] adhere to that consensus in spite of presidential opposi-
tion,”170 and to assert its “independent role.”171  In fact, the Senate has grown 
tougher with respect to nominations to the federal circuit courts.  The con-
firmation rate for those nominees has fallen significantly in the last thirty 
years, from 92% under President Carter to 71% under President Clinton and 
74.6% under President George W. Bush.172   
The increasingly acrimonious battles over nominations to the federal 
courts of appeals, however, do not offer an encouraging model for the po-
tential impact of a “get tough” plan in the Senate for Supreme Court nomi-
nees.  As the Senate has confirmed circuit court nominees at a lower rate, 
the pace of the process has also slowed considerably.  Between 1945 and 
1986, new court of appeals judges were confirmed in an average of one to 
two months; between 2000 and 2006, the average time until confirmation 
stretched to more than a year.173  Among Article III judgeships, 49 of 871 
authorized positions on the federal courts are currently vacant, including 
sixteen vacancies on circuit courts.174  The result is a process as “ugly and 
divisive” as it has ever been, with many highly qualified candidates unwill-
ing to endure the long struggle to confirmation.175  Surprisingly, Eisgruber 
 
166  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142–43. 
167  Id. at 179 (“[I]t is easy to explain these practices on strategic grounds.”). 
168  Id. 
169  Simson, supra note 16, at 653. 
170  See Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 992 (1992).  
171  Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1512. 
172  WITTES, supra note 13, at 39–41; Stras, supra note 11, at 1073.  For the Bush Administration, 
the rate of confirmation is current through October 2007.  Id. 
173  WITTES, supra note 13, at 38–39; Stras, supra note 11, at 1073. 
174  OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/judicialnominations.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
175  See Stras, supra note 11, at 1074. 
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almost entirely ignores the transformation of the appellate court appoint-
ments process, and thus he overlooks the potentially serious costs—
including indefinite vacancies and a serious drain on the pool of willing 
candidates—of encouraging the Senate and President to wage an escalating 
war over Supreme Court nominations. 
More fundamentally, there are good reasons why a “get tough” strategy 
has become difficult for the Senate to execute when evaluating Supreme 
Court nominees.  As we explain in brief here, and develop more fully in 
Part II, proposals for greater resilience on the part of the Senate fail to ap-
preciate the institutional strength and tactical options of the President.  A 
“get tough” plan underestimates the President in several ways. 
First, a “get tough” plan ignores the political realities facing the Senate.  
Even in cases of divided government, senators face enormous political pres-
sures.  As we explain in Part II, the strategic selection of nominees by a 
President can make it politically difficult for senators of either party to 
block a nomination.  One component of this strategy, as Eisgruber recog-
nizes, is the selection of ideologically moderate nominees.176  A rich empiri-
cal literature also demonstrates, however, that choosing nominees 
strategically based on other characteristics, especially qualifications, in-
creases the odds of confirmation.177  Selecting a highly qualified individual 
helps to weaken Senate resistance, even if the nominee is ideologically dis-
tant from most senators. 
The challenges of a “get tough” plan are particularly clear in proposals 
like Eisgruber’s, which direct senators to repudiate nominations made by 
same-party Presidents for being too extreme or for a nominee’s recalci-
trance in answering questions.  It is simply unrealistic to expect that sena-
tors will unilaterally disarm in such a politicized process, rejecting an 
ideologically attractive nominee and insisting on a moderate even in the ab-
sence of a tactical need and with no assurance that the other party will re-
turn the favor when the circumstances are reversed.178  The failed 
nomination of Harriet Miers by President George W. Bush dramatically il-
lustrates the point.  The Miers nomination was undermined to some degree  
by fellow Republicans who controlled the Senate and wanted Bush to 
nominate someone more conservative—or at least a more prominent and re-
liable conservative.179  It is difficult to imagine those senators, under similar 
 
176  See infra Part II.A. 
177  See infra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. 
178  CARTER, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that “the nature of modern partisan politics” makes such a 
move unlikely because “members of the President’s party will not want to oppose him without very 
strong reasons”). 
179  JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 272–73, 276 (2007).  Although concerns 
about Miers’s qualifications and charges of cronyism also played a role in the unraveling of the nomina-
tion, it was clear that many Republican senators would not settle for a moderate—or a “stealth” candi-
date with the potential to be moderate—and were willing to break ranks with a President of their own 
party to avoid ending up with one.  Id. at 278–83. 
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circumstances, accepting Eisgruber’s advice to insist upon someone less 
conservative.   
Second, and more importantly, plans for the Senate to “get tough” fail 
to appreciate the reality that Presidents, too, can “get tough.”  When Presi-
dents decide to fight for an imperiled nominee, they have a number of po-
tent weapons at their disposal.  We discuss three of the President’s options 
in Part II: the use of the bully pulpit, the power to make recess appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court, and the strategic use of logrolling techniques 
and threats to veto legislation.180  Empirical research by political scientists 
suggests that some of these tools have been particularly effective for Su-
preme Court nominations, even when they have been less effective for cir-
cuit court nominations.  Although some of these tactics are controversial 
and have been used sparingly in the past, they demonstrate how a plan for 
the Senate to toughen up might provoke a strong response from the Presi-
dent and only escalate the conflict over judicial appointments.  These op-
tions help to explain why, to date, the Senate has disappointed Eisgruber 
and others who have called for greater resolve in challenging the Presi-
dent’s nominations to the Supreme Court. 
II. NAVIGATING THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
When commentators recommend that the Senate assert itself more vig-
orously at the confirmation stage to block unacceptable nominees, they of-
ten view the process only from the perspective of senators.  They fail to 
take into account the institutional strength of the Presidency or the myriad 
tools at a President’s disposal in navigating the judicial appointments proc-
ess.  The Senate’s assertion of its will in rejecting qualified nominees is 
likely only to raise the stakes in future nominations and force Presidents to 
get tough in response.   
In this Part, drawing on empirical findings by political scientists, we 
demonstrate that the conflict over Supreme Court nominations is multifac-
eted and dynamic.  Presidents have powerful tools at their disposal to coun-
teract resistance by the Senate, including increasing the pressure on senators 
both by exercising the power of the Presidency and by marshalling external 
groups to assist an imperiled nominee.  The most commonly deployed and 
historically successful tactic is the strategic selection of nominees.  Other 
tools include: (1) the use of the bully pulpit by the President, (2) the em-
ployment or threat of recess appointments to the federal courts, and (3) log-
rolling techniques or credible threats to veto legislation.  We demonstrate 
that a President can use these tools to fight back against a “get tough” strat-
egy in the Senate and secure confirmation for many Supreme Court nomi-
 
180  See infra Parts II.B–D. 
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nees, even those that are ideologically divergent from the pivot point of the 
Senate.181 
A. Strategic Selection 
The most basic and powerful tool a President can use to improve con-
firmation odds is the strategic selection of Supreme Court nominees.  Se-
lecting a nominee is a delicate process, and a President’s margin for error 
depends on a host of tactical considerations.  Nonetheless, the available re-
search suggests some guidelines for Presidents determined to make it diffi-
cult for the Senate to reject Supreme Court nominees. 
1. Constraints on Strategic Selection.—Most academic research fo-
cuses on the confirmation stage of the judicial appointments process—the 
factors that influence the Senate’s consideration of judicial nominees.182  
The dearth of research on the selection side is due in no small part to the 
tiny group of close advisors that are privy to the selection methodologies 
employed by Presidents.  The institutionalization of the Presidency and the 
expansion of the staff of the White House, particularly the Counsel’s office, 
have centralized much of the decisionmaking about judicial nominations in 
the White House.183  In contrast, the Senate provides a comparatively easy 
object of study as the deliberations over judicial nominees are open, heavily 
covered by the media, and the fodder of interest group activity.   
The available research identifies several constraints on a President’s 
selection of a Supreme Court nominee.  According to Christine Nemacheck, 
who has engaged in the most probing study of presidential selection to date, 
perhaps the most important external factor is whether the President faces a 
Senate controlled by the opposite party.184  A number of scholars have 
found that divided government reduces the likelihood that the Senate will 
confirm a judicial nominee and, in recent years, that it also increases the 
amount of time required for confirmation.185  Indeed, Sarah Binder and For-
 
181  For the confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee, the pivotal senator is likely to be, but is not 
always, the fifty-first senator that is willing to vote in favor of confirmation because filibusters of Su-
preme Court nominees are rare.  See CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION 28–29 (2007); 
Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institu-
tional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1093 (1999). 
182  See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 15; Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1070. 
183  See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 85–86, 93, 106. 
184  See id. at 66; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 107 (2005). 
185  See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 66 (citing multiple studies on both phenomena); Sarah A. 
Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947–1998, 46 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 190, 195 (2002); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses 
to Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1136–38 (1999).  But see Glen 
S. Krutz et al., From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate, 
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 871, 878 (1998) (finding that divided government does not make it more likely 
that Supreme Court nominations will fail).   
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rest Maltzman found that the hazard rate (or likelihood) of a decision by the 
Senate on a judicial nominee “decreases during divided government by 
nearly fifty percent compared to periods of unified control.”186  In other 
words, a “president would like to appoint his preferred nominee without re-
gard to his opposition’s preferences, but he recognizes that he is constrained 
by the Senate, especially when it is controlled by the opposition party.”187  
In recent years, the ability of the opposition party to mount a filibuster, es-
pecially against lower court nominees, also has influenced presidential se-
lection of judicial nominees.188   
In addition, decreased political capital, either because of low approval 
ratings or the approach of the end of a term in office, constrains the selec-
tion decisions of Presidents.189  As in the case of ordinary legislative initia-
tives, scholars have found that it becomes more difficult for Presidents to 
gain confirmation for a judicial nominee as their remaining time in office 
decreases because “the incentive for members of Congress to bargain with 
the president declines,” especially if the President is viewed as a “lame 
duck.”190  Political scientists have also found that a President’s approval rat-
ings affect nominee selection.  Although the impact of approval ratings is 
not clear as an empirical matter, some studies have found that high approval 
ratings give Presidents greater freedom to nominate a candidate who is 
closer to the President’s own ideology.191  
The criticality of the particular nomination at issue also constrains the 
President’s choice of nominee.  “Critical” nominations, those that will in-
fluence the ideological balance of a court, receive greater scrutiny than 
nominations that replace an outgoing judge with a like-minded successor.192  
 
186  See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 196.  
187  NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 66. 
188  See id. at 67. 
189  See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 197 (focusing on the diminished political capital to-
ward the end of presidential terms); Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nomi-
nees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 528 (1990) (discussing constraints on 
Presidents toward the ends of their terms); Krutz et al., supra note 185, at 878 (finding that presidential 
approval ratings often influence the success of judicial nominations); McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 
185, at 1139–41 (noting that Presidents are more likely to succeed in judicial appointments toward the 
beginning of their terms in office). 
190  NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 70–71. 
191  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 108; NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 80; Timothy R. 
Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations, 
32 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 31, 38 (2005); Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1088–90.  But cf. 
Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 197 (“[P]opular presidents are no more able to get their nomi-
nees approved quickly than less popular ones . . . .”). 
192  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 108–09 (“Simply stated, when an appointee is likely to 
tip the ideological balance of a circuit, senators are more likely to drag their feet over the confirma-
tion.”); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation 
Process, 55 J. POL. 793, 797–98 (1993).  One prominent example of a noncritical appointment was the 
replacement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist with his former law clerk, John G. Roberts, both of 
whom were appointed by Republican Presidents.   
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Such scrutiny occurs most often when a President replaces judges appointed 
by a different party.  As P.S. Ruckman has noted, nearly 60% of all unsuc-
cessful nominations to the Supreme Court have involved attempted oppo-
site-party replacements.193  An opposite-party replacement to the Supreme 
Court is defined as critical when it would result in a one-member partisan 
split (i.e., a 5-4 continuing majority with a high possibility of swing voting), 
create a partisan deadlock, or establish a new partisan majority on the 
Court.194  In other words, opposite-party replacements are critical when 
“they involve the added possibility of having a substantial impact on the 
partisan balance” of a court,195 such as when President Nixon nominated 
Harry Blackmun to fill the seat vacated by Democratic-appointee Abe For-
tas.196  Indeed, not only is it more difficult for a President to successfully 
confirm a nominee when a critical nomination arises, but according to 
Charles Shipan and Megan Shannon, such a nomination also results in 
greater delay than with noncritical nominations.197 
2. The Power of Strategic Selection.—Despite those constraints, a 
substantial body of empirical research demonstrates that strategic selection 
of nominees by the President can dramatically improve the chances of con-
firmation, even when the opposing party controls the Senate.  We discuss 
three aspects of this strategy: (1) the selection of highly qualified nominees, 
(2) the selection of ideologically moderate nominees, and (3) pre-
nomination consultation with the Senate.  Strikingly, the selection of highly 
qualified nominees has been the President’s single most effective tactic, 
even in cases where such nominees are ideologically distant from the pivot 
point in the Senate. 
First, empirical work by Lee Epstein, among others, demonstrates that 
the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees can have a dramatic impact 
on the likelihood of confirmation.198  In studying the votes of every senator 
 
193  See Ruckman, supra note 192, at 797. 
194  See Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Su-
preme Court Confirmations, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 654, 661 (2003). 
195  Ruckman, supra note 192, at 798. 
196  See id. at 797.  It bears noting that, consistent with the hypothesis that critical nominations tend 
to lead to greater conflict between the President and the Senate, President Nixon’s first two nominees to 
fill the Fortas vacancy—Clement Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell—were both rejected by the 
Senate.  See id. 
197  See Shipan & Shannon, supra note 194, at 665.  But cf. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 
197 (finding that critical nominations at the lower court level only lead to greater delay when there is 
divided government). 
198  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 69; Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in 
the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2005); see 
also Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530 (finding that the qualifications of a nominee are “equally 
important” to the “ideological distance between senators and nominees”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court 
Confirmations Are As Messy As They Should Be, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 11, 2005, at B6, B7 (re-
viewing the available research and concluding that “[q]ualifications matter—as much today as they have 
in the past”). 
102:1869  (2008) Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments 
 1899 
 
on every Supreme Court nominee since the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury—2451 votes in all—Epstein and Segal found that “a highly qualified 
nominee would receive about forty-five more votes (on average) than one 
universally deemed unqualified.”199  In an earlier study, Charles Cameron, 
Albert Cover, and Jeffrey Segal analyzed 2054 confirmation votes from 
Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy and similarly discovered that it is “over-
whelmingly” the interaction of qualifications and the ideology of nominees 
that “determines the votes of senators.”200  Recent experience tends to cor-
roborate those findings.  For example, it is not a stretch to say that Harriet 
Miers may have been confirmed to the Supreme Court had she been seen 
both by the public and the Senate as highly qualified, rather than just a close 
confidante and crony of President George W. Bush.201  Likewise, due to the 
criticality of the nomination to replace departing Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, it is fair to speculate that Samuel Alito may have faced a filibus-
ter or an unfavorable Senate vote had he not served previously with distinc-
tion as a Third Circuit judge, United States Attorney, and Supreme Court 
advocate in the Solicitor General’s office.202  
Second, senators are more likely to vote for a nominee who shares or 
approximates their own political ideology than for a nominee who is ideo-
logically distant.203  According to Epstein and Segal, a Supreme Court 
nominee receives only about 57% of the votes of ideologically distant sena-
tors, while an ideologically congruent nominee receives 98% of the possible 
 
199  EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 103.  To measure a nominee’s qualifications, the study 
used a technique that examines the content of newspaper editorials about Supreme Court nominees that 
were written between the time of their nomination and their confirmation vote in the Senate.  See id.  
Although the newspapers examined in the study reflected rough ideological balance, one wonders the 
extent to which a nominee’s ideological views may have influenced a newspaper’s assessment of that 
nominee’s qualifications.  For example, we wonder whether Robert Bork received a less favorable 
evaluation of his credentials because many senators, including Edward Kennedy, had already character-
ized his jurisprudence as outside of the mainstream of legal thought.  Indeed, according to the study, 
Bork was the tenth least qualified nominee, whereas Lewis Powell, who had never been a judge before 
his nomination to the Supreme Court, tied for the most qualified nominee since 1953.  See id. at 105.  
Although any further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we would hypothesize 
that Epstein and Segal’s methodology overstates the influence of qualifications on a nominee’s pros-
pects for confirmation, though we have no doubt that a nominee’s qualifications play a highly influential 
role in the votes of senators. 
200  See Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530–31.  The Cameron, Cover, and Segal study also used 
newspaper editorials to measure both the ideology and qualifications of Supreme Court nominees.  Id. at 
529.  It measured senators’ ideology using the ratings assigned by a liberal interest group, Americans for 
Democratic Action.  Id. 
201  See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Religious Right’s Hard Call, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22, 
2007, at 1 (noting the concerns about Harriet Miers’s qualifications to sit on the Supreme Court). 
202  See, e.g., Ferrell Bount, Op-Ed., The Real Samuel Alito: Judge Is Most Qualified Supreme Court 
Nominee in Seven Decades, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 10A (noting that the ABA gave 
Samuel Alito “the highest rating possible” with respect to his qualifications). 
203  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 109. 
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votes.204  Cameron, Cover, and Segal similarly observed that the votes of 
senators are “decisively affected” by the ideological distance between a 
senator and a Supreme Court nominee.205  Although operationalizing the po-
litical views of nominees and senators can be difficult, and there is vigorous 
scholarly debate over the role that political considerations ought to play in 
the Senate’s evaluation of Supreme Court nominees,206 there is no doubt that 
a President can improve the odds of confirmation by selecting nominees 
with ideological appeal to senators of the opposition party. 
Eisgruber makes a similar point in defense of his proposal to select 
moderates for the Supreme Court, noting that Presidents have had more dif-
ficulty winning confirmation for their nominees when they have chosen ex-
tremists.207  As an initial matter, most empirical work in this area employs a 
conventional definition of moderation that situates Justices along an ideo-
logical continuum with other members of the Court.  It is therefore unclear 
the extent to which the existing empirical evidence on judicial ideology 
supports Eisgruber’s claim that moderates, as he defines them, would enjoy 
greater rates of confirmation.208  Even so, Eisgruber goes further, making 
clear that he would not be satisfied with the selection of moderates for 
merely tactical reasons.209  His proposal calls for senators to block extrem-
ists from reaching the Court even in cases of unified government where 
concessions to opposition senators are unnecessary, which is unrealistic 
given the dynamics of confirmation politics.210 
 
204  See id. at 113.  Like Cameron, Cover, and Segal, the Epstein and Segal book also used the scores 
assigned by Americans for Democratic Action to measure the ideology of senators.  Id. at 111; see supra 
note 200. 
205  See Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530.  
206  Compare TRIBE, supra note 9, at 132–33 (arguing that the Senate and the President should be 
“equal partner[s]” and that it is perfectly permissible for senators to consider the ideology of judicial 
nominees), and Paulsen, supra note 144, at 552 (“Far from forbidding inquiries into judicial ideology, 
we should give free rein to ideology in the battle over judicial appointments.”), with, John C. Eastman, 
The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 646–47 
(2003) (stating that, in the Founders’ views, the role of the Senate in the appointments process was quite 
limited), and Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 687 
(1989) (asserting that, in Bork’s confirmation, “[t]he Senate should have confined its investigation to 
determining whether the nominee was intellectually competent and whether his nomination was tainted 
by cronyism, corruption, or crass political partisanship”).  
207  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 156. 
208  As stated above, Eisgruber employs an idiosyncratic definition of “moderate” that has two prin-
ciple features: special solicitude toward claims of the disadvantaged and a thoughtful understanding of 
the limits of the judicial role.  See EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 121; supra notes 68–76 and accompany-
ing text. 
209  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 179. 
210  See Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1075–76.  According to a leading game-theoretic 
model developed by Moraski and Shipan, the President is generally unconstrained in making appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court during periods of unified government and when the Court’s median is to the 
right or the left of both the Senate and the President.  Under such circumstances, the Senate will accept 
any nominee that moves the ideological median of the Court in the direction that it prefers.  See id. (de-
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Moreover, several studies suggest that highly qualified nominees are 
difficult for the Senate to reject, even when they are ideologically distant 
from the median pivot of the Senate.  Highly qualified nominees to the Su-
preme Court between 1953 and 2005 received a staggering 99.3% of a pos-
sible 602 votes from ideologically compatible senators.211  For nominees 
deemed “not qualified,” that number drops to 91.8%.212  For those nominees 
who are ideologically distant from senators, the difference could not be 
more stark: well-qualified nominees received 94.8% of the possible 231 
votes, while those nominees deemed not qualified received only 1.7% of a 
possible 115 votes.213  It is for these reasons that Timothy Johnson and Ja-
son Roberts conclude that “presidents have a greater deal of power over the 
nomination process—even when they face ideological constraints in the 
Senate—and that they use this power to gain confirmation for their pre-
ferred choices.”214  Although there is evidence that ideological compatibility 
has become a stronger predictor of confirmation since the 1950s, qualifica-
tions have remained consistently influential for more than a century.215  The 
numbers speak for themselves: despite recent difficulty in gaining confir-
mation for some lower court nominees, only four Supreme Court nominees 
have been rejected by the Senate since 1900, while fifty-five have been ap-
proved.216   
Third, pre-nomination consultation with senators when forming the 
short list of candidates to fill a Supreme Court vacancy can reduce the de-
gree of opposition that Presidents face.217  According to Nemacheck, “[b]y 
                                                                                                                           
scribing the President as “unconstrained” under those circumstances).  The failed nomination of Harriet 
Miers appears to be inconsistent with that prediction, perhaps because of Moraski and Shipan’s assump-
tion of a single-period game.  See id. at 1072; supra note 179 and accompanying text (describing the 
Miers nomination).  Neither the political science literature nor the Miers nomination, however, offers 
any support for the scenario envisioned by Eisgruber, in which the Senate rejects ideologically attractive 
nominees on the ground that they are not moderate enough.   
211  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 114. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Johnson & Roberts, supra note 191, at 44. 
215  Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. 
POL. 296, 302 (2006) (noting that while the influence of qualifications on confirmation have remained 
fairly steady, ideology has become a more important aspect of the Senate’s consideration of nominees 
since the 1950s). 
216  See Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1069.  One possible partial explanation for these re-
sults is that the President enjoys the exclusive power to make the next nomination.  Because the Presi-
dent alone chooses nominees to the Supreme Court, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, senators must always 
consider whether expending significant resources to defeat a nominee will prompt the President to 
choose someone equally objectionable, or even worse.  See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 191, at 45 
n.11 (discussing “the iterative nature of the nomination game” and suggesting that the fact that the game 
“potentially has many rounds” helps to explain why even when the President’s party lacks a filibuster-
proof majority in the Senate, Presidents have greater success in securing nomination than spatial models 
of ideological distance would otherwise predict).  
217  See WITTES, supra note 13, at 115, 119.   
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listening to members of Congress in developing his short list, the president 
might be seen as being conciliatory in terms of his deliberations, which in 
turn could help establish a more favorable nomination environment.”218  
Even if the President does not ultimately select a senator’s suggested nomi-
nee, senators appreciate consultation because it “can bolster their image 
both within the chamber and with their constituents.”219  Such consultation 
can be especially effective when the President faces divided government,220 
there is enough opposition to filibuster a nominee,221 or presidential capital 
is especially low.222  For example, President Clinton’s two Supreme Court 
nominees, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, enjoyed relatively 
smooth confirmations in part because President Clinton consulted infor-
mally with the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Orrin Hatch, prior to nominating them.223 
The available research thus demonstrates that the strategic selection of 
nominees can weaken resistance from senators.  Choosing a highly quali-
fied individual, paying attention to a nominee’s political views, and pre-
nomination consultation with key senators can put pressure on the opposing 
party and increase the odds of confirmation, even during periods of divided 
government.224  Proponents of a “get tough” plan for the Senate should not 
underestimate the President’s power to frame the confirmation debate by 
strategically selecting nominees that are difficult for the Senate to reject. 
B. “Going Public” and the Use of the Bully Pulpit 
Even after selecting nominees, the President has considerable institu-
tional strength in influencing the confirmation of nominees.  One powerful 
tool the President can use to smooth the path to confirmation is “going pub-
lic” or using the bully pulpit to tout the qualifications and attributes of 
nominees.  Empirical research suggests that Presidents have deployed this 
 
218  NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 40. 
219  Id. at 40–41. 
220  See id. at 65–66. 
221  See id. at 67. 
222  See id. at 70–71. 
223  See ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR 180 (2002); 
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 41; Richard J. Durbin, No Constitutional Right to a Rubber Stamp, 
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 989, 998–99 (2005); Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Presidential Capital 
and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 66 J. POL. 663, 664 n.3 (2004). 
224  Of course, the research demonstrates only that these techniques have been successful in the past, 
not that they will be in the future.  An important part of Eisgruber’s project is to explain to senators and 
the public that, although “[l]egal acumen and experience are obviously important,” presidential claims 
about the qualifications of their nominees are often unreliable, and in any event, a focus on qualifica-
tions is inappropriate because “judging is not like umpiring.”  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 16.  We sus-
pect, however, that the Senate’s strong tendency to confirm highly qualified nominees has not resulted 
from a naïve and mistaken belief among senators that Supreme Court decisionmaking is entirely techni-
cal and nonpolitical.  Instead, for instance, concerns about the legitimacy of the Court and respect for the 
rule of law might lead senators to prefer highly respected and accomplished nominees. 
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strategy most frequently when their nominees are imperiled, but it can also 
be influential to further entrench support for nominees who would other-
wise be confirmed.   
The benefits and risks of the using the bully pulpit are apparent in the 
legislative arena, where the President plays an active role in setting “both 
the public agenda and the congressional agenda.”225  Ronald Reagan, for in-
stance, won important budget battles “early in his first term by imploring” 
that citizens “contact [their] senators and congressmen.”226  Unlike most 
senators and members of Congress, Presidents have the attention of the en-
tire country and thus can influence the legislative agenda by “go[ing] over 
the heads” of other political figures and making their appeals to the general 
public.227  With respect to ordinary legislation, one risk of using the bully 
pulpit too often is that it can eliminate bargaining options for both the 
President and Congress.228  As Johnson and Roberts have observed, once 
Presidents have “draw[n] a line in the sand” on some policy or budgetary 
initiative, it is often difficult for them to continue to bargain without appear-
ing as if they have capitulated to congressional demands.229  Johnson and 
Roberts further explain that “going public” can be a risky strategy because 
it uses precious political capital and is not always successful.230  For in-
stance, President George H.W. Bush used the bully pulpit to try to influence 
congressional consideration of his budget proposals, but that approach 
failed miserably with the Democratic Congress.231 
The use of the bully pulpit in contested confirmation battles can be a 
powerful weapon for the President.  Before the twentieth century, Presi-
dents were reluctant to speak out publicly about their policies or judicial 
nominees out of fear that they would be perceived as demagogues.232  Once 
the Seventeenth Amendment was passed in 1913 and senators became more 
accountable to the general public,233 Presidents increasingly used the power 
of public persuasion to “mold mandates for policy initiatives.”234  Even after 
the use of the bully pulpit became more common for legislation, however, 
Presidents still hesitated to use public appeals for judicial nominees.235  
Presidents eagerly wanted to avoid being perceived as “stooping to ‘poli-
 
225  Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 665. 
226  Id. 
227  See id. 
228  See id. at 666. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. 
231  See id. 
232  See John Anthony Maltese, The Presidency and the Judiciary, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 499, 513–14 (Michael Nelson ed., 6th ed. 2000); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE 
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 95 (1987). 
233  See Stras, supra note 11, at 1058–61. 
234  See Maltese, supra note 232, at 513. 
235  See id. at 514. 
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tics’” in order to have their judicial nominees confirmed.236  In one promi-
nent example, Herbert Hoover desperately desired to publicly support his 
doomed Supreme Court nominee, John J. Parker, in 1930 but ultimately de-
cided against it.237  Although Presidents such as Harry Truman and Dwight 
Eisenhower spoke publicly about some of their Supreme Court nominees,238 
Ronald Reagan was the first President to make widespread use of the bully 
pulpit in the judicial appointments context.  Indeed, President Reagan made 
a whopping seventy public statements in favor of Robert H. Bork, greater 
than the total number of public statements made in favor of Supreme Court 
nominees by all of the Presidents that preceded Reagan.239   
In a recent study, Timothy Johnson and Jason Roberts examined the 
conditions under which Presidents are most likely to “go public” in support 
of their Supreme Court nominees.  According to the study, Presidents are 
most likely to make public statements when a nominee is ideologically dis-
tant from the Senate’s filibuster pivot, the Supreme Court’s median Justice 
is ideologically distant from the pivotal senator, and the President and Sen-
ate fall on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.240  In fact, Presidents 
are “almost five times more likely to go public to fight for their chosen 
nominee” to the Supreme Court when their nominees are ideologically dis-
tant from the Senate.241  Presidents will also release “almost three times as 
many public statements when their nominee will not move the Court me-
dian ideologically closer to the pivotal Senator.”242  Therefore, Presidents 
tend to use the bully pulpit most often when they are “ideologically con-
strained by the Senate.”243  Most importantly, the Johnson and Roberts study 
demonstrates that the strategy works with respect to Supreme Court nomi-
nees: Presidents who publicly support their nominees are likely to reduce 
the number of “nay” votes actually cast as compared to the number of such 
votes estimated by predictive models that are based on ideological dis-
 
236  See id.  Instead, Presidents often used surrogates to make a public case for their judicial nomi-
nees.  See id. at 516.  For instance, Woodrow Wilson used Norman Hapgood, the editor of Harper’s 
Weekly, to publicly tout Supreme Court nominee Louis Brandeis in 1916.  See id.  Richard Nixon also 
made aggressive use of his new Office of Communications to publicly support the unsuccessful nomina-
tion of Clement Haynsworth in 1969.  See id. 
237  See id. at 514. 
238  See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 672. 
239  See id.  
240  Id. at 669–70, 675–78.  Johnson and Roberts used Segal/Cover scores, derived from newspaper 
editorials, to measure the ideology of Supreme Court nominees.  Id. at 673.  It used DW-NOMINATE 
scores, based on nearly all roll-call Senate votes, to measure the filibuster pivot of the Senate.  Id. at 673 
& nn.19–20; see KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997) (discussing DW-NOMINATE scores). 
241  Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 676. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. at 674. 
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tance.244  For example, Johnson and Roberts surmise that absent President 
George H.W. Bush’s twenty-nine public statements of support, Justice Cla-
rence Thomas would not have been confirmed by the Senate.245  
There are, of course, exceptions.  Robert Bork’s nomination was 
soundly defeated despite numerous public statements by President Ronald 
Reagan,246 and Harriet Miers’s nomination failed despite immediate public 
statements of support by President George W. Bush.247  Therefore, suppor-
tive statements by the President certainly do not guarantee confirmation for 
a Supreme Court nominee.248  Nonetheless, the empirical evidence demon-
strates that robust use of the bully pulpit can lead to more favorable out-
 
244  Id. at 679.  Although Presidents have enjoyed remarkable success in going public in support of 
Supreme Court nominees, they have not been nearly as successful in using the bully pulpit in support of 
nominees to the lower federal courts.  See Lisa M. Holmes, Presidential Strategy in the Judicial Ap-
pointment Process: “Going Public” in Support of Nominees to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 35 AM. POL. 
RES. 567, 586 (2007).  Lisa Holmes hypothesizes that this distinction may exist because there is a “‘res-
ervoir of goodwill’ that stymies effective mobilization against Supreme Court nominees,” while going 
public in support of lower court nominees can in some instances entrench ideological opposition against 
them.  Id. at 588 (quoting James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Politicized Confirmation Processes 
and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 17, 2006) (paper presented at the 64th Annual Na-
tional Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at http://www.allacademic.
com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/3/9/3/5/pages139352/p139352-1.php).  
245  See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 679.  
246  Despite making seventy statements in favor of Robert Bork—so many that “it seemed that the 
president would use virtually any public forum to push his nominee, whether signing a proclamation for 
National Hispanic Heritage Week or German American Day”—the nomination ultimately failed by a 
58-42 margin.  See Maltese, supra note 232, at 514.  Bork’s nomination failed due, at least in part, to the 
ideological distance between Bork and the Democratic Senate, the criticality of the nomination to re-
place swing vote Lewis Powell, Bork’s remarkably candid answers to questions by members of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, and the late date at which the vacancy arose during Reagan’s second term.  See 
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 70; Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 528; Fein, supra note 206, at 
676–77, 683. 
247  President Bush went public to support Miers the day after the nomination “to quell a revolt 
within his own party . . . in the face of Republican complaints that he ha[d] drifted from his ideological 
moorings.”  Peter Baker & Shailagh Murray, Bush Defends Supreme Court Pick, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 
2005, at A1.  He made additional statements of support on at least four subsequent occasions over the 
next three weeks, before the nomination was eventually withdrawn.  See Charles Babington, After the 
Home Run, a White House Balk?; Handling of Miers Nomination Cannot Stand Up to Ease of Roberts 
Approval, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A4; Peter Baker & Dan Balz, Bush Rejects Calls to Withdraw 
Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at A8; Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Role of Religion Emerges as 
Issue, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A8; Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Conservatives Es-
calate Opposition to Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005, at A2. 
248  Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Supplemental Materials: Presidential Capital 
and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process 8 (Aug. 2004), http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/
ks7ZPa/johnson%20supplements.pdf (supplementing Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, and acknowl-
edging that the authors’ theory “cannot explain” the Senate’s rejection of Bork, but maintaining that “no 
theory is perfect, and the fact that we are able to say, with confidence, that 25 of the last 26 Supreme 
Court nominees have been helped by presidents willing to go public on their behalf is a very important 
finding both theoretically and substantively”). 
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comes for Supreme Court nominees, especially in cases where a nomination 
faces stiff resistance from the Senate.249 
C. Recess Appointments 
Presidents also possess other tools to persuade the Senate to confirm an 
embattled nominee.  One of the most important is the power to temporarily 
circumvent the process altogether by exercising their constitutional power 
to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, 
by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Ses-
sion.”250  Although there is a robust debate in the scholarly literature about 
the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,251 every circuit that has 
considered the question has held that Presidents possess the power to recess 
appoint federal judges to Article III courts, including during intrasession re-
cesses of the Congress.252  As the Eleventh Circuit held in considering 
President George W. Bush’s recess appointment of William Pryor, Jr. to 
that court, while there is some tension between the Article III requirement 
of life tenure and the recess appointment power, “the temporary judges ap-
pointed under the Recess Appointments Clause are an exception to the gen-
eral rule of Article III.”253  Recess appointees, the court held, are “afforded 
the full extent of the authority commensurate with” the office during the 
 
249  Eisgruber argues that “it would be a mistake to ignore the power of ideas” because “[p]ublic un-
derstandings of the appointments process will affect how that process is conducted.”  EISGRUBER, supra 
note 6, at 16.  Eisgruber may be correct that over the long term, books like The Next Justice might blunt 
the effectiveness of the bully pulpit by directing the public’s attention to a sophisticated understanding 
of judicial philosophy rather than a nominee’s qualifications and public support—the subjects of public 
statements by the President that have proven effective.  See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 671.  
It is difficult to imagine, however, given the institutional advantages of the Presidency in defining the 
public debate surrounding Supreme Court nominations, that abstract notions of judicial philosophy and 
moderation will come to dominate discussions about judicial nominees.  
250  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
251  In interpreting the text of the Clause, scholars have focused on two major questions: first, 
whether the vacancy to be filled must actually arise or merely exist during the recess of the Senate; sec-
ond, whether the power may be exercised only during intersession recesses of Congress or whether it 
also applies to intrasession recesses.  Although the courts are unanimous that the President’s power is 
extremely broad with respect to both questions, see infra note 252 and accompanying text, scholars are 
still debating the scope of the power.  See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III 
Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2005); William Ty Mayton, Recess 
Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 515 (2004); Steven M. Pyser, Re-
cess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitutional Transformation of Senate Advice and 
Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61 (2006); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (2005); Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court: 
Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124 (1957).  Due to the unanimity of the federal courts on 
the constitutionality of recess appointments for federal judges and the rich scholarship on the subject, 
any further discussion of the constitutionality of the Recess Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of 
this Review Essay. 
252  See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley, 
751 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1962). 
253  Evans, 387 F.3d at 1223. 
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pendency of the recess appointment.254  The text of the Clause makes clear, 
however, that recess appointees may only serve for a limited time.  For ex-
ample, an individual that is appointed by the President during a recess oc-
curring in the middle of the first session of Congress will be eligible to 
serve until the end of the second session, which is likely to be late in the 
following year.255 
Although Presidents have been less willing to appoint judges using re-
cess appointments over the past forty years,256 there is a rich history of ag-
gressive use of the power to reshape the federal Judiciary.  Over the course 
of American history, Presidents have made 248 recess appointments to fed-
eral district courts, 43 to the federal circuit courts, and 12 to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.257  Few remember that President Dwight Eisen-
hower employed the power liberally, recess appointing Chief Justice Earl 
Warren and Justices William Brennan and Potter Stewart prior to confirma-
tion by the Senate.258  Eisenhower used the recess appointment power stra-
tegically to appoint each right before a national election.259  Other Presidents 
 
254  Id. 
255  T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A 
LEGAL OVERVIEW (2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33009_20050726.pdf.  The records 
of the Founding era provide little information about the scope or operation of the Clause.  Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 67 implies that the purpose of the power was primarily pragmatic: 
The ordinary power of appointment is confided to the President and Senate jointly, and can there-
fore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but, as it would have been improper to 
oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers; and as vacancies 
might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without de-
lay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the president, singly, to make tempo-
rary appointments “during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at 
the end of their next session.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 346 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948). 
Hamilton’s statement was meant to respond to the critique that the exception of unilateral appoint-
ment would swallow the prevailing rule of joint appointment by the Senate and the President, and other 
statements from the Founding debates are in accord with Hamilton’s view.  See Statement of Archibald 
Maclaine at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 102–03 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); Proceedings of the Pennsylvania 
Convention, Dec. 10, 1787 (statement of Thomas McKean), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 537 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).  Indeed, prior to the Civil War, the 
Recess Appointments Clause was necessary for continuity of government because Congress typically sat 
in session for only three to six months per year and then often went into recess for between six and nine 
months at a time.  See Rappaport, supra note 251, at 1500–01.  
256  Only four judges have been given recess appointments to an Article III court since 1964: Walter 
Heen (Ninth Circuit), Roger Gregory (Fourth Circuit), Charles Pickering (Fifth Circuit), and William 
Pryor (Eleventh Circuit).  See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL31112, RECESS 
APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL JUDGES 19 (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/
pdf/RL31112.pdf; Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, 
34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 656, 659 (2004). 
257  See Hogue, supra note 256, at 659–61. 
258  See id. at 660. 
259  Michael Brus, What Is a Recess Appointment?, SLATE, June 14, 1999, http://www.slate.com/
id/1002994. 
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have also used the power “for political purposes,” including George Wash-
ington, who recess appointed John Rutledge to the post of Chief Justice of 
the United States in 1795, though Washington’s use of the power “gener-
ated significant controversy” and ultimately played a role in the Senate’s re-
jection of Rutledge’s nomination.260  Indeed, the first five Presidents used 
the power a total of thirty-one times to appoint judges, including the ap-
pointment of five Supreme Court Justices.261 
Not surprisingly, the primary institutional opponent to robust use of the 
recess appointment power has been the Senate, which has often viewed the 
power as circumventing the Senate’s advice and consent role in the ap-
pointments process.  For instance, in response to President Eisenhower’s 
aggressive use of the power to appoint three Justices to the Supreme 
Court,262 the Senate passed a resolution in 1960 stating that recess appoint-
ments to the Court “may not be wholly consistent with the best interests of 
the Supreme Court . . . and that such appointments, therefore, should not be 
made except under unusual circumstances and for the purpose of preventing 
or ending a demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the Court’s 
business.”263  Later, in 1985 and 1986, Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd 
objected to President Reagan’s recess appointments to executive agencies 
during brief, intrasession recesses of the Senate.264  Byrd threatened to sus-
pend Senate action on nearly every pending nomination, including 5700 
military promotions, but the White House averted the conflict by agreeing 
to provide notice to the Senate in advance of future recess appointments.265  
Senator James Inhofe likewise threatened to place a hold on President Clin-
ton’s judicial nominations in 1999 in response to several of Clinton’s recess 
appointments,266 but a showdown was again prevented when Trent Lott, the 
Senate Majority Leader at the time, failed to support Inhofe’s proposed 
moratorium.267   
Recently, the Senate has moved aggressively to block the President 
from making recess appointments.  In 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid scheduled pro forma sessions of Congress during periods of traditional 
Senate recess in order to prevent President George W. Bush from making 
 
260  See HALSTEAD, supra note 255, at 2.  Rutledge was also rejected by the Senate as a result of his 
publicly expressed opposition to the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.  See MALTESE, supra note 138, at 
27–29. 
261  See HALSTEAD, supra note 255, at 2. 
262  See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text. 
263  S. Res. 334, 86th Cong., 106 CONG. REC. 18145 (1960). 
264  See Hogue, supra note 256, at 667. 
265  See id. at 668–69. 
266  See Carrie Johnson, Judges 2000: Many Chosen, Few Named, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 
10.  
267  See Neil A. Lewis, Two Clinton Judicial Choices Are Named After Lott Forces Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A25. 
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recess appointments to the executive and judicial branches.268  While it re-
mains to be seen whether Senator Reid’s strategy can be sustained, or even 
become routine over the long term, it goes without saying that robust exer-
cise of the recess appointment power by Presidents is risky because it can 
generate powerful, negative responses from Congress.   
Surprisingly, presidential use of the recess appointment power, even on 
executive branch appointments, is one of the most understudied and lightly 
theorized issues in the literature about the Presidency.269  In light of historic 
Senate opposition to robust use of the recess appointment power, Presidents 
must be careful, particularly with respect to the timing of the appoint-
ment.270  As Henry Hogue has observed, recess appointments during intras-
ession recesses have been more controversial than those during intersession 
recesses, and it is therefore unsurprising that of the more than three hundred 
recess appointments to Article III courts, only fourteen have been made dur-
ing an intrasession recess.271   
Recess appointments during brief recesses, whether intra- or inter-
session, have also led to greater interbranch conflict.272  Perhaps the most 
aggressive use of recess appointments was by President Theodore Roose-
velt, who appointed more than 160 individuals to various nonjudicial posts 
during what he called a “constructive recess” between two sessions of Con-
gress, even though “there was no break in time between the two ses-
sions.”273  President Roosevelt’s appointments stirred quite a bit of 
controversy and the Senate Judiciary Committee emphatically rejected the 
notion of a “constructive recess” in a report it published approximately 
fourteen months later.274  Similarly, President Bush’s appointment of Judge 
Pryor during a ten-day recess in 2004 angered many Democratic senators, 
though the Senate eventually confirmed Pryor because of the agreement 
reached by the Gang of Fourteen.275 
 
268  See Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Play Recess Hardball, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at 
A01.  
269  See Pamela C. Corley, Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential 
Power, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 670, 672 (2006). 
270  In a related study of the use of recess appointments to independent agencies, Pamela Corley 
found that Presidents are more likely to use recess appointments when they lack partisan support in the 
Senate, when they have high public approval ratings, and when they are in the last year of their terms in 
office.  See id. at 677–678.   
271  See Hogue, supra note 256, at 669–70. 
272  See id. at 667. 
273  See id. at 671. 
274  See HALSTEAD, supra note 255, at 10. 
275  See Gail Russell Chaddock, As Politics Flare, Judicial Appointments Take a Recess, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 6, 2004, at 3; Greg Land, 53-45 Vote Gives Pryor Lifetime Bench Seat, FULTON 
COUNTY DAILY REP., June 10, 2005, at 1.  The Gang of Fourteen was a bipartisan group of senators in 
the 109th Congress that reached an agreement to prevent the employment of the so-called “nuclear op-
tion” by Senate Republicans, which could have ended the use of the filibuster on judicial nominees.  The 
agreement also resulted in the confirmation of several stalled judicial nominees, including Judge Pryor. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1910
Nonetheless, recess appointments are a powerful tool that may enable 
Presidents to overcome resistance in the Senate in two ways.  First, recess 
appointments can help to overcome a Senate filibuster by temporarily cir-
cumventing the process and placing the nominee directly on the bench.  
Presidents can also threaten a recess appointment in response to senatorial 
obstruction, reducing delays and forcing a vote on stalled nominations.  
Second, the performance of a nominee during a recess appointment might 
improve the prospects for confirmation.  A recess appointee who serves 
with distinction and avoids controversy during a brief stint on the bench can 
make a powerful case for her own confirmation.276  The Senate might shift 
from a searching review of a nominee’s qualifications and ideology to her 
actual performance over the course of a short judicial career.277  To be sure, 
the strategy is risky.  Recess appointing an ideologically objectionable 
judge risks angering opposition party senators and, as a result, may actually 
solidify opposition and make the prospects for confirmation more diffi-
cult.278  History has shown, however, that in some circumstances recess ap-
pointments can be a powerful option for Presidents. 
None of these observations should be understood as an endorsement, 
implicit or otherwise, of the practice of recess appointing Supreme Court 
Justices.  As a descriptive matter, however, the ability to make strategic re-
cess appointments remains a powerful tool for Presidents who wish to in-
fluence confirmation politics or encourage Senate action on judicial 
nominees.  That Presidents have the constitutional power to unilaterally 
(though temporarily) appoint Supreme Court Justices illustrates the diffi-
culty that senators may encounter when attempting to “get tough” with re-
spect to Supreme Court nominations. 
D. Legislative Tactics 
Finally, Presidents can use legislative tactics to influence the judicial 
appointments process.  Specifically, Presidents have the power to veto, or to 
threaten to veto, ordinary legislation if the Senate fails to confirm a nomi-
nee to the Supreme Court.  They can also resort to the distinctively legisla-
tive practice of trading political favors, also known as “logrolling.”279  
These strategies would be controversial, but as Eisgruber recognizes, the 
 
276  The possibility that recess appointees will view their brief service on the Court as a kind of 
“audition” is, of course, the reason that scholars and courts have questioned whether they pose a threat 
to judicial independence.  See supra note 251. 
277  See Pyser, supra note 251, at 113.  
278  See E-mail from Rachel Brand, former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Pol-
icy, to David Stras, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (Dec. 12, 2007, 
08:38 CST) (on file with author) (stating that many officials in the George W. Bush Administration be-
lieved that “getting recess appointed . . . kills your prospects of getting confirmed except in very unusual 
circumstances”); supra notes 262–268 and accompanying text.  
279  See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1338–39 (2000). 
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stakes of Supreme Court nominations are enormous.280  If the Senate were 
to “get tough,” as he suggests, we would expect the President to consider all 
available options in response. 
With respect to nominations to the lower courts, the Senate has already 
begun to employ parliamentary tactics like the filibuster and legislative 
practices like vote logrolling.  As Senator Orrin Hatch has noted, logrolling 
has become  
[the] norm.  Today, votes on nominees are often traded like commodities—ten 
judges in exchange for a vote on this, two commissioners for a vote on that.  
This objectionable practice is so common and accepted that it has become as 
important in keeping the Senate functioning as unanimous consent and other 
key parliamentary rules.281 
Justice Breyer, for instance, reportedly received his nomination to the First 
Circuit in exchange for Senator Edward Kennedy’s support of President 
Jimmy Carter’s efforts to secure a second presidential term.282  Although 
there is little evidence that logrolling exists in the appointment of Supreme 
Court Justices, such behavior would not be surprising in light of Senator 
Hatch’s recognition that it has become an important, even common, aspect 
of the judicial appointments process.   
The President’s most powerful source of leverage in the legislative 
process, however, is the presidential veto.283  From 1789 to 1992, Congress 
has overridden just 7% of the 1448 presidential vetoes, meaning that Presi-
dents are highly effective when they elect to use the veto pen.284   
Two dominant, game-theoretic models describe presidential use of veto 
threats.285  The first is the coordination model, in which Congress possesses 
 
280  EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 187 (noting that the Court’s prominence on issues of political im-
portance gives the President a strong incentive to choose an “ideologically pure” nominee). 
281  See NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 152 (2005) (quoting HATCH, supra note 223, at 123). 
282  SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT 
THROUGH REAGAN 261 (1997). 
283  The Presentment Clause provides that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United 
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return to it, with his Objections to that House in 
which it shall have originated . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  Congress must then pass the legisla-
tion by a supermajority two-thirds vote of both chambers in order to override the veto and for it to be-
come law.  See id.  Interestingly, the Advice and Consent Clause and the Presentment Clause share 
structural oddities, and in some ways each is the mirror image of the other.  The veto, though a power 
wielded by Presidents, is found in the Presentment Clause of Article I, which predominantly discusses 
legislative power.  Likewise, the advice and consent power of the Senate, which is obviously a legisla-
tive power, is found in Article II, which almost exclusively describes executive power. 
284  See Nolan M. McCarty & Keith T. Poole, Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of 
Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 282, 283 (1995). 
285  A third, the commitment model, posits that the effectiveness of veto threats turns on the public 
rhetoric of Presidents.  See Daniel E. Ingberman & Dennis A. Yao, Presidential Commitment and the 
Veto, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 357 (1991).  Under the model, when Presidents commit publicly to veto legis-
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uncertainty about the President’s ideal policy point.286  In this model, if 
Congress views a President’s public veto threat as credible and is uncertain 
about the President’s ideal policy point, “the majority will meet the presi-
dent’s demands as far as possible to circumvent a veto.”287  Under this sce-
nario, “the president may choose to object publicly to many more 
legislative provisions than he actually opposes in order to maximize poten-
tial concessions.”288  Without delving into the minutiae of the coordination 
model, it is sufficient to say here that the model successfully explains ex-
ecutive-legislative bargaining as an empirical matter, primarily because it 
provides a rationale for why “presidents are typically not compelled to ac-
tually apply vetoes to threatened legislation” on every occasion.289 
An example from the presidency of George H.W. Bush nicely illus-
trates the coordination model.  In 1989, President Bush proposed legislation 
providing federal support for child care through tax credits for families with 
children under the age of four.290  At the time, Democrats held an eighty-
five seat advantage in the House of Representatives and a ten seat advan-
tage in the Senate.291  Democrats, not surprisingly, championed a different 
proposal, the Act for Better Child Care (ABC), which would have funded 
child care through block grants to states, creating a new federal entitlement 
and strict guidelines for child care providers.292  As the ABC bill was being 
debated in the Senate, President Bush launched a veto threat through Senate 
Majority Leader Bob Dole, who stated that “the president’s advisors would 
recommend a veto unless the contested provisions, including the grants to 
parents, [were] dropped.”293  After a great deal of negotiation between Con-
gress and the White House, President Bush finally signed a version of the 
                                                                                                                           
lation it “can be seen as a commitment designed to shore up the president’s informal powers of persua-
sion.”  Rebecca E. Deen & Laura W. Arnold, Veto Threats as a Policy Tool: When to Threaten?, 
32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 30, 33 (2002).  For a President, however, “reneging on a veto threat might 
entail electoral retaliation or cost the president in the court of public opinion.”  Richard S. Conley, 
George Bush and the 102d Congress: The Impact of Public and “Private” Veto Threats on Policy Out-
comes, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 730, 732 (2003).  The costs to the President of reneging on a veto 
threat also enhance the credibility of the threat in the view of Congress, meaning that it may not attempt 
to pass the legislation if the President has made a credible veto threat.  See id.  A more thorough discus-
sion of the commitment model is omitted because, to date, the available empirical data on veto bargain-
ing is not supportive of its explanatory power. 
286  See Conley, supra note 285, at 732. 
287  See id. at 732. 
288  See Richard S. Conley, President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995–2000: Political 
and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government, 31 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 133, 137 
(2004). 
289  Id. at 138. 
290  See Rebecca E. Deen & Laura W. Arnold, Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush 
Administration (1989–1993): Preliminary Evidence from Case Studies, 29 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 
47, 56–57 (2002). 
291  See id. at 55–56. 
292  See id. at 57–58. 
293  Id. at 58. 
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bill in November of 1991 that funded the program primarily through tax 
credits, but also required states to create licensing standards for child care 
providers and provided a $2.5 billion block grant to states to be used for 
poor families.294  The strategic use of a veto threat enabled the Bush Ad-
ministration to eliminate portions of the bill that it opposed while still ful-
filling one of Bush’s chief campaign promises—all without ever actually 
using the veto pen.295 
A second model, the blame-game model, provides an explanation for 
when the coordination model fails.  This model explains interbranch rela-
tions when Congress seeks to intentionally provoke a veto in order to lessen 
the public approval ratings of the President.296  The model has particular ex-
planatory power in election years or when the majority in Congress at-
tempts to pass legislation that is particularly popular with the public.297  
Congress engages in this game because preliminary evidence does in fact 
demonstrate that presidential approval ratings drop following a veto.298  An 
interesting, recent example of blame-game politics is the Democratic rheto-
ric regarding President George W. Bush’s recent veto of the popular State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) legislation, which is popular 
even among Republican voters and has generated widespread negative press 
for the Administration.299  
Both models demonstrate, to varying degrees, that Presidents wield the 
veto power in order to influence the legislative process and set the congres-
sional agenda.  The scholarly literature, however, is devoid of any discus-
sion of using veto threats to influence the judicial appointments process.  
That absence might be explained by the binary nature of senators’ votes on 
a judicial nominee.  Unlike ordinary legislation, a confirmation vote is not 
subject to a presidential veto, and the Senate either votes yea or nay on the 
nominee.  As with recess appointments, however, the President can use veto 
threats as an antifilibuster strategy.  Senators may be inclined to oppose a 
Supreme Court nominee but might also fear that the President’s veto could 
delay or permanently shelve legislation they consider crucial to their 
chances for re-election.  As Richard Conley noted with respect to President 
George H.W. Bush’s Administration, veto threats were “quite successful in 
 
294  See id. at 59. 
295  See id.  As Richard Conley’s study of George H.W. Bush’s papers also reveal, public veto 
threats are only part of the story.  See Conley, supra note 285, at 733.  Presidents also routinely threaten 
to veto primarily lower-priority legislation through private veto threats sent to selected members of 
Congress.  See id.  According to Conley, “not a single bill on which Bush issued a private veto threat 
passed or was vetoed.”  See id. at 737. 
296  See Conley, supra note 285, at 732–33. 
297  See C. Lawrence Evans & Stephen Ng, The Institutional Context of Veto Bargaining 4–5 (un-
published manuscript), available at http://clevan.people.wm.edu/The_Institutional_Context.pdf. 
298  See id. at 5. 
299  See Sean Lengell, House Approves Revised SCHIP Bill; Democrats Lack Veto-Proof Votes, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A04. 
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exacting concessions from the congressional majority.”300  A President with 
a larger strategic view can use public or private veto threats to encourage 
senators to support judicial nominees in exchange for a promise not to veto 
a piece of favored legislation.  Of course, as the coordination and commit-
ment models require, a President must make a credible threat to veto legis-
lation or the threat will be ignored by the Congress.  For instance, a veto 
threat by President George W. Bush on a bill to generously increase spend-
ing on the Iraq War would not be seen as particularly credible by Congress, 
but a veto threat on a piece of entitlement legislation might well be.   
For Presidents, this strategy is not without risks.  Historically, Presi-
dents typically have used veto threats to extract concessions related to the 
legislation that is subject to the threat, not to influence senators on unrelated 
matters, such as other bills or judicial appointments.301  Presidents who pub-
licly threaten to veto popular legislation to win confirmation of a Supreme 
Court nominee therefore may appear unprincipled, risk a public backlash, or 
even prompt counterattacks by senators and House members who could 
stall the President’s legislative agenda or block other nominees.  Further-
more, as Rebecca Deen and Laura Arnold have observed, vetoes and veto 
threats can make Presidents look weak because of their “inability to lead 
Congress.”302  Moreover, frequent use of veto threats without actually veto-
ing legislation can undermine the effectiveness of veto threats as a credible 
tool to “move the congressional majority toward the president’s preferred 
position.”303  For those reasons, Presidents are unlikely to use veto threats 
except as a last resort to get their most important (and embattled) nominees 
confirmed.304   
Yet commentators such as Eisgruber who hope that a resurgent Senate 
can rein in Presidents who engage in ideologically driven selection should 
not underestimate the impact of presidential veto threats in moving the Sen-
ate majority toward confirmation.  A targeted veto-threat strategy might be 
particularly effective in the judicial appointments context.  Such a strategy 
would focus on minor legislation that is of special importance to key mem-
bers of the Senate but that is unlikely to actually “result in vetoes and inter-
 
300  See Conley, supra note 285, at 738. 
301  There are instances, however, where Presidents have used judicial appointments to garner sup-
port for other legislative initiatives, which means that appointments and legislation are not necessarily 
strictly separable.  See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 282, at 173 (reporting that Lyndon Johnson was will-
ing to give an opposition-party senator influence over the selection of judges in order to get his “help on 
[a] tax bill”). 
302  See Deen & Arnold, supra note 285, at 31. 
303  Id. 
304  See id. 
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branch confrontation,”305 such as a spending provision that benefits the state 
of a key senator but has no wider public saliency.306 
Further, as Richard Conley has suggested, Presidents can help to insu-
late themselves from public and congressional repercussions by issuing pri-
vate rather than public veto threats, because such threats often avoid “blame 
game politics” and a showdown between the branches.307  Recent political 
science research suggests that Presidents use private veto threats far more 
often than previously thought.  Indeed, Deen and Arnold estimated that 
25% of the vetoes threatened during the presidency of Gerald Ford were 
privately communicated to senators and not reported in the popular press.308  
For George H.W. Bush, just under 20% of his veto threats were “purely 
private,” while approximately 20% more fell into the “private-to-public” 
category, which means that they were originally communicated privately to 
senators but were later reported in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re-
port or on the AP wire.309  In his study, Conley found that private and pri-
vate-to-public veto threats were “quite effective in winning concessions 
from Congress” with respect to ordinary legislative measures, but the record 
was mixed with regard to highly salient legislation.310  Meanwhile, only six-
teen of the 205 veto threats during the George H.W. Bush Administration 
failed to win the “policy concessions” sought by the White House,311 which 
means that the use of veto threats can be a highly effective strategy in mov-
ing the congressional majority toward a President’s preferred policy posi-
tions.312   
The use of logrolling and veto threats to win support for a Supreme 
Court nominee is underexplored in the empirical literature.  Research in the 
context of ordinary legislation strongly suggests, however, that these tactics 
could be effective in persuading recalcitrant senators to vote in favor of ju-
dicial nominees that they might otherwise oppose.  Through logrolling and 
 
305  See Conley, supra note 285, at 731.  A targeted strategy also minimizes the risk of both angering 
and provoking a counterattack by members of the House of Representatives, who are not involved in 
consenting to judicial appointments.  
306  For example, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska felt so strongly about funding for a bridge to Grav-
ina Island in Alaska, dubbed the “bridge to nowhere” by critics, that he threatened to quit the Senate if 
his earmark was not approved.  Editorial, A Bridge Too Far, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2005, at A16.  Presi-
dents willing to get tough in the fight for a Supreme Court nominee could exploit such parochial inter-
ests through veto threats or logrolling strategies. 
307  See Conley, supra note 285, at 731. 
308  See id. at 733 (citing Deen & Arnold, supra note 285). 
309  See id. at 735. 
310  Id. at 739; see also id. at 741 (“Bush won more clear-cut compromises and concessions on much 
ordinary legislation, including appropriation measures that were the focus of many of the private-to-
public threats in the 102d Congress.”). 
311  See id. at 743. 
312  See CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE 
POWER 193 (2000) (“Veto threats usually bring concessions.”); id. at 198 (“Presidential scholars have 
long suspected that veto threats are a powerful tool for presidents.”). 
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the judicious use of targeted and private veto threats, a President can force-
fully push back against a Senate that attempts to “get tough” against Su-
preme Court nominees. 
 
 * * * 
 
Our aim in describing these techniques—strategic selection, the bully 
pulpit, recess appointments, and legislative tactics like logrolling and veto 
threats—is not to claim that they will always be successful.  Nor do we 
mean to suggest that they will be used, or should be used, in particular cir-
cumstances.  Rather, the availability of these techniques helps to explain 
why the Senate has not followed the advice of scholars like Eisgruber to 
block ideological or recalcitrant Supreme Court nominees, even though it 
has begun to “get tough” with respect to nominations to the lower courts.  
Senators cognizant of the President’s institutional strength and strategic op-
tions likely will think twice before escalating the conflict over a nominee in 
all but the most compelling cases.   
The President’s available arsenal also serves as an indication of how 
ugly the Supreme Court appointments process could become if the Senate 
chooses to “get tough.”  The confirmation process for nominees to the cir-
cuit courts of appeals now involves extraordinary delays and acrimony, 
with the President turning to recess appointments and the Senate using fili-
busters and other legislative tactics to stall judicial nominees.313  Importing 
those features into the Supreme Court appointments process would have se-
rious costs, and proponents of a “get tough” strategy by the Senate should 
carefully consider the consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the new politics of judicial appointments, many com-
mentators have proposed Senate-specific reforms, appealing to senators to 
stand up to the President and block unacceptable nominees.  In The Next 
Justice, Christopher Eisgruber joins their ranks.  He calls for the Senate to 
“get smart” by asking penetrating questions about the judicial philosophy of 
Supreme Court nominees in an effort to ensure that future Justices are mod-
erates rather than extremists.  He also proposes that the Senate “get tough” 
by rejecting any nominees who do not prove to be moderate or who fail to 
give satisfactory answers at their confirmation hearings.  We have serious 
reservations about the specifics of Eisgruber’s reforms, which are predi-
cated on a questionable definition of a “moderate” and an incomplete diag-
nosis of the reasons behind the increasing politicization of the appointments 
process.  In particular, Eisgruber underestimates the influence of interest 
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groups and the media, which create powerful pressure for senators to de-
liver ideological results. 
All proposals that depend on effective resistance by the Senate must 
also overcome the substantial institutional strength of the Presidency.  A 
rich political science literature demonstrates that a “get tough” strategy by 
the Senate is likely to provoke a strong response from the President, who 
has a number of tools available to deal with Senate resistance.  The most 
basic and powerful is the strategic selection of Supreme Court nominees, 
especially those with excellent qualifications, which can make it difficult 
for senators to delay or reject those nominees.  In the face of an obstruction-
ist Senate, Presidents can also draw upon their substantial institutional 
strength by “going public” and touting the qualifications and attributes of 
the nominee, by making or threatening a recess appointment, and by em-
ploying ordinary legislative techniques like logrolling strategies and credi-
ble veto threats.  Strategic employment of these tactics makes it more 
difficult for senators of either party to obstruct Supreme Court nominees 
and, as a result, undermines the effectiveness of Senate-specific reforms to 
the appointments process. 
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